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The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) has failed to control the
global proliferation of biological and toxin weapons (BTW). The BWC lacks procedures for
verifying compliance of signatories. This shortcoming, in combination with advances in
biotechnology and a changing global security environment, makes BTW an attractive weapon for
developing nations and non-state actors.
A decade-long effort to strengthen the BWC with an inspection protocol, has been
hampered by disagreement over intrusive inspection and the threat posed to national security and
industrial competitiveness. Current debate within the United States over the costs and benefits of
BWC verification fails to consider the impact of U.S. involvement in the inspection regime on the
behavior of other signatories, especially nations such as China which are suspected of violating
the BWC.
Michael Swaine's model of Chinese government decision making is used to evaluate
reactions to three U.S. policies toward BWC inspections. Research suggests that within the
Chinese bureaucracy, responsibility for BWC verification overlaps institutional interests of
security, economics, and foreign policy. I show that U.S. participation in the protocol will affect
the Chinese calculation of the costs and benefits of accepting an inspection regime. U.S
acceptance of inspections raises the level of Chinese benefits at least to the level of their
perceived costs and may encourage more responsible nonproliferation policy. With U.S. inaction
or rejection of BWC inspections, Chinese perceived costs of accepting inspections exceed the
possible benefits.
If the United States is serious about internationalizing nonproliferation efforts, the
administration needs to consider the effect of U.S. policy on the BTW and BWC policies of other
Conference members. One way of encouraging China in nonproliferation efforts may be to push
forward and accept intrusive inspections, with an understanding of their limitations and costs, as
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Efforts to control the use and proliferation of biological and toxin weapons
(BTW) can be traced to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and 1972 Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BWC). These agreements have not been completely effective
because they lack a mechanism to verify compliance. Changes in the international
security environment over the last decade, in combination with technical advances in
biotechnology, have made BTW an increasingly attractive weapon for developing nations
and substate groups.
Negotiations to strengthen the BWC with an inspection protocol to confirm
compliance are ongoing in Geneva. While a "rolling draft" proposal addressing
procedures for compliance monitoring exists, members of the Convention remain split
over the issue of intrusive inspections. Debate in the United States is divided between
arms control advocates, who believe inspections will be useful in promoting compliance
and detecting violations, and those who argue that the nature of BTW and their
production make verification impossible and pose serious risks to U.S. industrial
competitiveness. Neither side, however, explicitly considers the likely effects of U.S.
participation in inspections on the behavior of other Convention parties - especially those
in violation of the BWC.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) presents U.S. policy makers with a
dilemma. Despite its membership in the BWC since 1984 and an official policy denying
possession of BTW, U.S. intelligence agencies suspect that the Chinese maintain an
offensive BTW program. Limiting the further proliferation of WMD, and especially
xiii
BTW, is an important priority for the United States and its allies. It is therefore important
to consider the likely impact of U.S. participation in a BWC inspection regime on the
institutions that formulate Chinese arms control policy.
Michael Swaine's model of Chinese bureaucratic decision making suggests that
institutional subarenas formulate different aspects of foreign policy. Nonproliferation
policy is one area that overlaps the responsibilities of the defense, foreign policy, and
intelligence subarenas, requiring disparate groups to reach consensus. Past behavior of
these subarenas shows that each considers different aspects of the external environment
when calculating the costs and benefits of a particular policy. Ongoing negotiations in
the BWC and its pending inspection protocol bring interests of the defense policy, foreign
policy, and strategic research, analysis and intelligence subarenas into conflict. Since
U.S. foreign policy alters the constraints and pressures exerted on PRC bureaucratic
entities, the course of action that the United States chooses may affect the outcome of
Chinese policy.
The U.S. delegation to the BWC lacks a formal position for negotiation of a BWC
inspection protocol. Given the incomplete status of the rolling text protocol and the lack
of consensus with regard to the utility of intrusive inspection for BWC compliance within
the U.S. government, American participation in the BWC is not guaranteed. Three
courses of action are available to the United States:
(1) The protocol could be accepted with an understanding of the
limitations of inspection for verifying compliance.
»
(2) The United States could opt to neither accept nor reject the
protocol, allowing negotiations over procedural details to
continue.
(3) The United States could reject the protocol altogether.
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If the United States agrees to accept the BWC inspection protocol, the costs to the
dominant defense subarena may be closely balanced by the benefits in the political,
economic, and technological areas. Chinese behavior would be dependent upon the
ability of foreign policy leaders to convince their defense counterparts that spillover
benefits of continued economic engagement for defense exceed the potential costs of
transparency. In the end, the PLA might accept transparency measures in hopes of
eventually benefiting from continued trade, investment, and technology transfer that
cooperation in arms control facilitates.
The Chinese policy reaction in the last two cases can be predicted with a high
degree of certainty. If the United States cannot reach consensus to either accept or reject
intrusive inspections as part of a BWC compliance protocol, Chinese delegates will try to
prolong negotiations indefinitely. China will likely continue to advocate nonproliferation
while circumventing prohibitions of BTW possession and transfer. A non-verifiable
BWC best serves Chinese strategic interests. The Chinese would be free to continue
clandestine production, while enjoying the economic and political benefits of improving
international relations.
American rejection of BWC inspection provisions could adversely affect the
interests of the research and intelligence subarena by limiting access to technology and to
a lesser degree affect foreign policy institutions by threatening to cool economic and
political relations. Without U.S. participation, however, it is unlikely that the PLA could
be persuaded to accept inspections. China would likely pursue limited bilateral BTW
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agreements, playing lipservice to nonproliferation with the goal of securing economic or
technological incentives.
The growth of the PRC and its past record in WMD proliferation necessitate its
active involvement in the BWC. If the United States is serious about internationalizing
nonproliferation efforts, the only chance of engaging nations like China in the process
may be to push forward and implement an inspection protocol. While expensive and not
a stand-alone solution to the problem of BTW proliferation, onsite inspections would be a
step toward improving the regime, and in the long term may encourage suspected BWC




Efforts to control the proliferation of biological and toxin weapons (BTW)
can be traced to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention. 1 These agreements have been unsuccessful because they lack a
mechanism to verify compliance. Changes in the international security environment
over the last decade, in combination with technical advances in biotechnology have
made BTW an increasingly attractive weapon for developing nations and substate
groups.
Negotiations to strengthen the BWC with an inspection protocol to confirm
compliance are ongoing in Geneva. While a "rolling draft" proposal addressing
procedures for compliance monitoring exists, members of the Convention remain split
over the issue of intrusive inspections. Debate in the United States is divided between
arms control advocates, who believe that inspections will be useful in promoting
compliance and detecting violations, and those who argue that the nature of BTW and
their production make verification impossible and pose serious risks to U.S. industrial
competitiveness. Neither side, however, considers the likely effects of U.S. participation
in inspections on the behavior of other Convention parties - especially those in violation
of the BWC.
The PRC presents U.S. policy makers with a dilemma. Despite its membership in
the BWC since 1984 and an official policy denying possession of BTW, U.S. intelligence
'Text of the BWC may be found on the Monterey Institute of International Studies
Nonproliferation Center's homepage. Available from http://cns.miis.edu/db/china/bwcorg.htm,
Internet.
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agencies suspect that the Chinese maintain an offensive BTW program.2 Limiting the
further spread of WMD, and engaging other countries in the nonproliferation effort, are
important priorities for the United States. Therefore, it is important to consider the likely
effect of U.S. participation in a BWC inspection regime on the arms control policy of
nations such as China.
B. METHODOLOGY
Michael Swaine's model of Chinese bureaucratic decision making suggests that
institutional subarenas formulate different aspects of foreign policy. Nonproliferation
policy is one area that overlaps the responsibilities of the defense, foreign policy, and
intelligence subarenas, requiring disparate groups to reach consensus. Past behavior of
these subarenas shows that each considers different aspects of the external environment
when calculating the costs and benefits of a particular policy. Ongoing negotiations in
the BWC and its pending inspection protocol bring interests of the defense policy, foreign
policy, and strategic research, analysis and intelligence subarenas into conflict. Since
U.S. foreign policy alters the constraints and pressures exerted on PRC bureaucratic
entities, the course of action that the United States chooses may affect the outcome of
Chinese policy.
The U.S. delegation to the Ad Hoc Group still lacks a formal position for
negotiation of a BWC inspection protocol. Within the U.S. government, neither the
Defense Department nor intelligence community believes that a BWC verification
protocol will provide sufficient compliance information to warrant the risk of possibly
2
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington,
D.C.: November 1997), 12.
compromising U.S. defense and trade secrets. U.S. industry, supported by the Commerce
Department, fears losing revenues and proprietary information. Officials at the State
Department are concerned that the BWC will impinge upon export control policies. 3 The
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and many in the U.S. Congress believe that an
inspection protocol may provide useful information, but cannot stand alone to ensure
compliance. The only strong believers in the utility of on-site inspections in providing
accurate compliance data are staffers on the National Security Council.4
Given the incomplete status of the rolling text protocol and the lack of consensus
with regard to the utility of intrusive inspection for BWC compliance within the U.S.
government, American participation in the BWC cannot be assumed. Three possible
courses of U.S. action are possible:
(1) The United States accepts the protocol with an understanding
of the limitations of inspection for verifying compliance.
(2) The United States neither accepts nor rejects the protocol;
negotiations over procedural details continue.
(3) The United States rejects the protocol.
The course of action that the United States decides to follow will alter the
perceived costs and benefits of BWC inspections for Chinese bureaucracies and could
affect the overall direction of the PRC's policy. This relationship is represented in
Figure 1.
Amy E. Smithson, "Man Versus Microbe: The Negotiations to Strengthen the Biological
Weapons Convention," in Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasonsfor Concern, Courses ofAction,
(Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, January 1998), 1 19.




















Figure 1. Hypothetical relationship between U.S. and PRC BWC policies
C. THESIS
The paper argues that if the United States accepts the BWC inspection protocol,
the costs to the dominant Chinese defense subarena may be less than the benefits in the
political, economic, and technological areas. Consensus might be reached to accept
transparency measures in hopes of eventually benefiting from continued trade,
investment, and technology transfer that cooperation in arms control facilitates.
A non-verifiable BWC also best serves the overall Chinese strategic interest. If
the United States cannot reach consensus, or if intrusive inspections are rejected as part
of a BWC compliance protocol, China will likely continue to advocate nonproliferation
while circumventing prohibitions ofBTW possession and transfer.
D. RELEVANCE
A verification protocol for the BWC will be an expensive endeavor requiring
long-term funding for inspections and continuous monitoring. Additional expense will be
»
incurred to counter threats to military and industrial secrets. UN Special Commission
Smithson, 1 19. Information collected by the author in a series of interviews with government
officials in Washington, D.C., between 13 and 16 April, 1998, supported Smithson's observations.
4
(UNSCOM) difficulties in Iraq, however, indicate that reaching international agreement
on the format and process of compliance monitoring is important. Verification may
prove to be costly, but the expense of military coercion to guarantee inspection team
access is a far more arduous task. 5
The growth of the PRC and its past record in WMD proliferation necessitate its
active involvement in the BWC. If the United States is serious about internationalizing
nonproliferation efforts, the only chance of engaging nations like China in the process
may be to push forward and implement an inspection protocol. While expensive and not
a stand-alone solution to the problem of BTW proliferation, onsite inspections would be a
step toward improving the regime, and in the long term may encourage suspected BWC
violators, including China, to accept international norms of responsible behavior.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
Chapter II identifies BTW and associated manufacturing techniques, and the
unique characteristics of BTW compared to other WMD. Chapter III explores the
problem of BTW arms control by tracing past use of BTW, efforts to control their
proliferation, and technological advancements responsible for a recent resurgence of
interest in their use. Chapter IV discusses efforts to strengthen the BWC, Chinese
participation in discussions over verification measures, and introduces the problem of
Chinese non-compliance with the BWC. Chapter V outlines the bureaucratic structures
involved in Chinese BTW verification policy, and the economic, political, and military
According to George Melloan, the cost of increasing U.S. miltary presence in the Arabian
Gulf last fall in response to Iraqi intransigence over UNSCOM inspections was approximately $1
5
considerations that affect each subarena. Chapter VI concludes by analyzing the potential
effects of three courses of U.S. action on BWC verification.
billion. See "Saddam Exploits The Economics of Warfare," The Wall Street Journal Interactive
Edition, 3 March 1998, available from http://www.wsj.com, Internet.
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II. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS
The wide variety of biological agents useful in warfare, the dual-use nature of
pathogens, and the technical aspects of their manufacture complicate BTW arms control
compliance verification, the most crucial element in any arms control regime. These
factors highlight the difficulties of negotiating procedures to monitor BWC compliance
and the ease in which nations such as China may circumvent treaty requirements in the
absence of an inspection protocol.
A. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WARFARE DEFINED
Biological and toxin warfare involves the deliberate use of disease and natural
poisons to incapacitate or kill people, domestic animals, and crops. Potential BTW
agents include microorganisms such as bacteria, rickettsiae, fungi, viruses, and toxins,
non-living chemicals manufactured by bacteria, fungi, plants, and animals. The potential
impact of biological agents in war is highlighted by the fact that throughout history, the
inadvertent spread of infectious disease during wartime has caused far more casualties
than actual combat.6
B. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN AGENTS
Not all disease-causing organisms are potential warfare agents. Of the several
hundred pathogenic microbes that afflict humans, only about 30 have been considered as
likely warfare agents.
1. BTW Classes
The following are classes of biological agents that have military applications:
• Bacteria are single-cell organisms that cause anthrax, brucellosis,
tularemia, plague, and other diseases. They vary considerably in infectivity
and lethality. The bacterium that causes tularemia, for example, is highly
infectious, with inhalation of as few as 10 organisms causing disease that is
fatal in 30 to 60 percent of those infected within 30 days. Brucellosis has a
mortality rate of only 2 percent, but an enormous capacity to incapacitate
those infected with fever, chills, and severe fatigue.
• Rickettsiae are parasitic organisms that only reproduce inside animal cells.
Examples with biological warfare potential include typhus, Rocky Mountain
spotted fever, and Q fever. Although occurring naturally in mammals and
arthropods such as ticks and lice, these organisms can be disseminated directly
through the air.
• Viruses are intracellular parasites consisting of a strand of genetic material
(DNA or RNA) surrounded by a protective coat that facilitates transmission
from one cell to another. Some hemorrhagic fever viruses, such as Lassa or
Ebola fever, are exceedingly virulent, with over an 80 percent mortality rate.
• Fungal pathogens do not generally cause disease in healthy humans, but
can be devastating to crops. Examples of plant fungal pathogens include rice
blast, cereal rust, and potato blight, which cause crop losses of 70 to 80
percent.
• A toxin is a poisonous substance made by a living system, or a synthetic
copy of a naturally occurring poison. A variety of toxins are manufactured by
bacteria, fungi, marine organisms, plants, insects, spiders, and animals, and
over 400 have been identified to date. After injection, ingestion, or inhalation,
they disrupt specific cellular functions such as the transmission of nerve
impulses, cellular protein synthesis or other vital physiological functions.
6
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), "Technical Aspects of Biological Weapons
Proliferation," Technologies Underlying Weapons ofMass Destruction (Washington: U.S.
Government: 1993), 71.
8
Toxins are categorized as either protein toxins, composed of chains of amino
acids, or non protein toxins.
7
Desirable characteristics of a military biological agent include high virulence, a
short incubation period between infection and symptoms, minimal contagiousness of the
disease from one individual to another, limited immunity within the target population,
insusceptibility to medical treatments, ease of production, and the ability to survive
environmental stresses such as heat, light, and desiccation during dissemination. 8
2. Anthrax - BTW of choice
Anthrax, caused by the bacterium Bacillus anthracis, is considered the
prototypical BTW agent. It is primarily a livestock disease, but also infects humans by
contact with infected animals, ingestion of contaminated meat, or inhalation of spores.
One gram of anthrax spores contains more than 10 11 particles. Since the lethal inhalation
dose for monkeys is between 103 and 104 particles, one gram of spores theoretically
contains 10 million lethal doses. After inhalation, anthrax spores multiply in the lymph
nodes and release toxins which cause fatal hemorrhaging within 4 days if not treated
immediately with antibiotics.
In addition to its lethality, anthrax has other characteristics that make it an
effective BTW agent. The disease is not contagious from one individual to another. It
would therefore not spread far beyond the intended target area or boomerang against the
attacker's troops or civilian population, assuming they did not enter a contaminated area.
Anthrax is also easy to produce in a modestly-equipped laboratory, and antibiotic-
resistant strains have been developed. Finally, when anthrax bacteria are incubated under
7OTA, "Technical Aspects of Biological Weapons Proliferation," 80.
8
Ibid., 77.
particular conditions, they transform into a rugged spore that is stable under a wide range
of environmental conditions and that can survive for up to 20 years or longer in soil. This
makes anthrax spores particularly well suited for delivery by missiles or bombs, since
they can survive explosive dissemination. 10
C. COMPARISON TO CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Although BTW are often grouped together under the term "weapons of mass
destruction" with chemical and nuclear weapons, they differ in important ways that
complicate the arms control process and should therefore be considered independently.
BTW agents are extraordinarily lethal, with potency hundreds to thousands of
times greater than that of the most lethal chemical warfare agents. One hundred
kilograms of anthrax released over a large city could potentially kill one to three million
people - results comparable to those of a one-megaton hydrogen bomb. 11 Whereas
chemical agents must be stockpiled in the hundreds or thousands of tons to be militarily
significant, a few kilograms of anthrax bacteria could cause comparable levels of
casualties. To guarantee 50 percent casualties over a one square kilometer area, one
metric ton of sarin would have to used, whereas only one gram of anthrax spores,
properly dispersed, could inflict the same number of deaths. Such small quantities of
agent are much easier to hide and transport.
9 OTA, 'Technical Aspects of Biological Weapons Proliferation," 79.
,0
Ibid.
"Jonathan Tucker, "Putting Teeth in the Biological Weapons Ban, " MIT's Technology
Review, January 1998, 38.
1
Jonathan Tucker, 24 February 1998 briefing.
10
Biotechnology is information-intensive rather than capital-intensive, and much of
the relevant data is available in published scientific literature. A number of recent
developments have also increased the availability of knowledge about developing BTW
agents: international telecommunications including the Internet; international exchange
programs in advanced biological sciences at U.S. universities; and increased international
cooperative efforts to control infectious diseases and advances in genetic engineering. 13
Several "cookbooks" with names like Silent Death, The Poisoner's Handbook, and
Assorted Nasties are available over the internet and explain production methods for
BTW. 14
Compared to chemical and nuclear weapons, BTW are extremely cost effective.
In a study conducted for the UN in 1969, a panel of experts estimated that to inflict large-
scale casualties over a one square kilometer would cost approximately $2000 with
conventional weapons, $800 with nuclear weapons, $600 with chemical nerve gas, and
only $1 with biological weapons. 15 While these figures are dated, the relative cost
differential today would likely be even greater, given advances in biotechnology.
Technologies and material to produce BTW are almost entirely dual use. There
is no way to distinguish between efforts to create an offensive capability and those
intended for defensive measures, which are permitted under the BWC. In addition, given
the fact that many of the infectious diseases associated with BTW are endemic
13Ted Procin and David Evans, Invisible Threat - Visible Responses: A DoD Perspective on




Joseph D. Douglass and Neil C. Livingstone, America the Vulnerable: The Threat of
Chemical and Biological Warfare (Lexingon, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), 1.
11
worldwide, there are legitimate reasons for nations to take advantage of commercially
available biotechnology to conduct research into areas directly related to BTW. 16
Many toxins with potential military applications have genuine therapeutic uses.
Plants and bacteria toxins are used to treat a range of medical conditions including
neuromuscular disease, cancer, autoimmune disease, and transplant rejection. For
example, since the late 1980s, botulinum type A toxin has been used for the treatment of
various muscle diseases including blepharospasm, repeated involuntary contraction of
the muscles around the eye, and hemifacial spasm. Patients receive small amounts of the
toxin by injection into affected muscle groups and the toxin causes near-paralysis of the
local muscle fibers for a period of weeks to months. In the United States and Europe,
approximately one million patients receive this treatment each year. 17
Whereas chemical weapons are made from distinctive precursor chemicals that
have limited legitimate uses, BTW use pathogens that are usually available domestically
for legitimate biomedical research or that exist naturally in soil or diseased livestock.
Pathogenic organisms are easily procured through biological repository companies that
stock various cultures in frozen and freeze-dried forms. An anthrax culture costs
approximately $45 through one U.S. commercial supplier. The only current requirement
for purchase is a signed form accepting responsibility for the receipt of the agent and
attesting to the existence of adequate facilities to work with pathogenic materials. This
end-user certificate requirement, however, can be easily circumvented. 18
1995, 33.
16
HoIly Porteus, "Grappling With the BW Genie," International Defense Review, March
I7
Alan Zelicoff, "The Dual-Use Nature of Biotechnology: Some Examples from Medical
Therapeutics," Kathleen C. Bailey, ed., Director's Series on Proliferation, no. 4 (Livermore, Calif.:
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 1994), 83.
,8
U.S. Government Publication, The Biological and Chemical Warfare Threat (no date), 31.
12
While specialized equipment such as artillery shells and cluster bombs can be
developed for BTW, these are not the most economical choice for weaponization. Dual-
use equipment such as agricultural aerosol generators attached to remotely-controlled
drones or possibly cruise missiles - which can themselves be constructed largely from
dual-use components - can be used to overcome the technically difficult hurdle of
delivery.
19
Compared to conventional, nuclear, and chemical arms, BTW are inexpensive,
relatively easy to produce using dual-use materials and technology, and extremely potent.
As with nuclear and chemical weapons, the destructive potential of BTW and the
likelihood that they may be employed in conflict has led to international attempts to
restrict their spread and use through arms control regimes.
D. ARMS CONTROL DEFINED
J. Christian Kessler defines an arms control regime as "a fabric of international
legal requirements reflecting and/or establishing accepted norms of national behavior, and
mechanisms to implement or operationalize these requirements."20 The regime is
composed of five components. The first element is an international treaty committing
each state party to forswear acquisition, possession, use, or the threat of use of the subject
weapon. Second, an international agreement is necessary to mandate national controls on
trade in technology relevant to the weapons to be controlled. Confidence building
measures (CBMs) are a third element. CBMs involve actions that manifest peaceful
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intentions and good faith and seek to decrease each side's threat perceptions, but do not
constitute proof of compliance. In contrast, the fourth requirement, verification, is a
mechanism to confirm that each state party to the agreement is acting in conformity with
its obligations and to detect those who violate their obligations. It is expected to provide a
high degree of confidence that forsworn behaviors are not being conducted covertly.
Sanctions, the final component of arms control, are means for pressuring regime violators
to conform.
21
Verification only became an important aspect of arms control in the last decade.
Applied first in a proposed draft treaty for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons by
Vice President Bush in 1984, on-site inspections of one form or another have been
included in every other arms contol negotiation from that point on. Today, verification is
considered essential for adequate and effective arms control.22
Verification consists of several distinct activities: collecting information on
activities of each state party; evaluating that information to consider whether and to what
degree there is evidence which may indicate that the state party is or is not complying with
commitments; and making a. judgment based on the weight of the evidence as to whether
the state party is or is not complying with its commitments. Verification seeks to prove a
negative, to prove that certain behavior does not exist. Proving the nonexistence of
prohibited BTW activity is inherently problematic. One can only demonstrate the failure
to detect proscribed behavior, not necessarily that it does not exist.
The BWC contains only the first three arms control elements, and efforts are
ongoing to create a verification mechanism combining both non-intrusive and intrusive
21
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measures. Non-intrusive measures include declarations of materials, equipment, and
facilities which could be of use in conducting the forbidden activity, but which are for
related but legitimate activities. Intrusive procedures include on-site inspections by
international authorities and monitoring of items, areas, and activities.
E. NON-VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL
Any arms control effort without provisions for verification of compliance, such as
the current BWC, is little more than an easily circumvented declaration of good faith.
While most agree that absolute compliance is nearly impossible to ensure, agreements
including the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), and recently the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC), have enacted verification protocols aimed at increasing the
level of certainty with regard to compliance. Parties to the BWC are currently working to
produce similar measures, but the nature of BTW and their production make the task
much harder than for either nuclear or chemical weapons. The historical record of BTW
use and the evolution of the BWC demonstrates the weakness of arms control efforts to
date and highlights the need for some way to monitor suspect proliferants such as China.
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III. THE CHALLENGE OF BTW ARMS CONTROL
Biological and toxin weapons have been employed in warfare throughout history.
Efforts to control their use began early in this century, but proliferation of the means to
produce BTW has continued in the face of agreements banning such activity. A changing
international security environment and advances in technology in conjunction with the
impotence of the Geneva Protocol and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention have
led to a "rediscovery" of BTW in the last decade. Interest in acquiring these weapons is
growing among both state and non-state actors. The international community is calling
for resolution of discussions over verification measures for the BWC.
A. EARLY BTW WARFARE
The first recorded use of BTW in war can be dated to the 14th century, at Kaffa
(now Feodossia, Ukraine) where attacking Tartars catapulted the bodies of comrades who
had succumbed to the plague over the walls of the besieged city. An outbreak of plague
was followed by the retreat of defending forces, and some medical historians believe that
the action spread the disease over the entire continent of Europe, via the Mediterranean
ports. Similarly, in the 1710 war between Russia and Sweden, Russian troops used the
cadavers of plague victims to start an epidemic within the enemy/
Smallpox was used as a biological weapon against Native Americans during the
French and Indian War (1754 - 1763) between France and England, in which both sides
relied heavily on the support of Indian allies. The British attacking Fort Carillon were
23William C. Patrick III, "A History of Biological and Toxin Warfare," Director's Series on
Proliferation, no. 4, ed. Kathleen C. Bailey, (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, 1994), 9.
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suffering heavy losses and General Sir Jeffrey Amherst decided to take advantage of an
outbreak of smallpox at Fort Pitt. Blankets from the Fort Pitt smallpox hospital which
were infested with disease-carrying fleas were provided to the Indians loyal to the
French, and the resulting epidemic decimated their ranks. Shortly thereafter, General
Amherst took Fort Carillon and renamed it Fort Ticonderoga.24
Germany developed an ambitious biological warfare program during the First
World War, featuring covert operations in neutral countries to infect livestock and
contaminate animal feed destined for export to Allied forces. German agents even
inoculated horses and cattle with the agents of anthrax and glanders disease in the United
States before they were shipped to France. Although horsepower was a major component
of wartime logistics, the German use of biological weapons failed to alter the course of
the conflict.
25
B. EARLY EFFORTS AT ARMS CONTROL - THE GENEVA CONVENTION
In response to the horrors of chemical warfare during the First World War,
international diplomatic efforts were undertaken to limit the proliferation and use of
WMD. The first attempt to restrict biological warfare was the 1925 Geneva Protocol for
the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. This treaty prohibited the use of biological
weapons, but did not proscribe research, production, or possession of biological
24George W. Christopher et al, "Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective," Journal of the
American Medical Association, 6 August 1997, 412.
25
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weapons." Many countries ratified the protocol while maintaining a right of retaliation.
There were no provisions for inspection to verify compliance with the protocol. Parties
to the Geneva Protocol that began research programs to develop biological weapons after
the First World War included Belgium, Canada, France, Great Britain, Italy, the
Netherlands, Poland, and the Soviet Union. In the interwar period, U.S. military planners
disagreed about the usefulness of BTW, and studies conducted by the Army Medical
Corps concluded erroneously that BTW would not be an effective warfighting tool
because of "modern sanitary procedures."27
C. THE JAPANESE PROGRAM IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR
Japan started an ambitious BTW program in 1937 near Harbin, in occupied
Manchuria, in a laboratory complex named "Unit 731." The facility consisted of five
satellite camps and housed a staff of more than 3000 scientists and technicians. Prisoners
were infected with a variety of pathogens including anthrax, meningitis, cholera, and
plague, and at least 10,000 prisoners died as a result of experimental infection or
execution following experimentation. These studies continued until 1945 when the
facility was burned to destroy evidence." Following the war, the United States granted
amnesty to scientists who had participated in the program in exchange for information
about their experiments. Participants in the program admitted to 12 large-scale field trials
of biological weapons. In addition, the water and food supplies of at least 1 1 Chinese
6
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cities were contaminated with anthrax, cholera, and salmonella. Cultures were tossed
directly into homes and sprayed from aircraft.
Unit 731 also developed plague and released as many as 15 million infected fleas
from aircraft over Chinese cities. The planes released grain to attract the local rat
population, which in turn spread the fleas. 30 From interviews, the Allies learned that
research had been conducted in the military application of tularemia, botulism, smallpox,
glanders, typhoid and other pathogens. The Japanese, had not, however, adequately
prepared, trained, or equipped their own troops for the hazards of biological weapons. A
cholera attack on Changteh in 1941 that reportedly resulted in 10,000 Chinese casualties
also produced 1,700 deaths among Japanese troops. 31
D. THE U.S. PROGRAM
The United States began an offensive biological program in 1942 under the
direction of the War Reserve Service. The program built a research and development
facility at Camp Detrick, Maryland, testing sites in Mississippi and Utah, and a
production facility in Terre Haute, Indiana. Experiments were conducted with anthrax
and Brucella suis, but the production facility failed a contamination test using simulant
test bacteria and large scale production was canceled due to safety concerns. However,
5,000 anthrax-filled bombs were produced at a pilot facility at Camp Detrick and tested
on Gruinard Island off the coast of Scotland in 1942. The island was heavily
contaminated and viable anthrax spores persisted until it was completely defoliated and
Christopher, "Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective," 413.
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sprayed with formaldehyde and sea water in 1986. 32 The American program was
expanded during the Korean War, after a more modern facility with improved production
technology and adequate safety measures was constructed at Pine Bluff, Arkansas.
Weapons production began in 1954 in conjunction with a program to develop biological
countermeasures to protect troops.
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Prior to production, animal tests were performed at Fort Detrick and on barges in
the Pacific. Human experimentation was conducted using simulant organisms. In
addition, U. S. cities were surreptitiously used to test aerosolization and dispersal
methods. In New York City, San Francisco, and other sites between 1949 and 1968,
simulants were released in covert experiments. In 1966 U.S. Army researchers released
trillions of benign bacteria called Bacillus subtilis into the New York midtown subway
station during rush hour. Light bulbs, each filled with some 87 trillion bacilli, were
tossed onto underground roadbeds or shattered on ventilation grills on the streets above.
The findings were alarming. The movement of the trains spread the germs into all but
one station of the entire Eighth Avenue and Seventh Avenue lines. The bacilli persisted
in the air for an hour, floating not only through stations but also into trains. The army's
final report concluded that "a large portion of the working population in downtown New
York City would be exposed to disease if one or more pathogenic agents were
disseminated covertly in several subway lines at a period of peak traffic."34 Defending
against such as eventuality, the report added, was almost impossible.
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In the mid-1960s, the U.S. Army also tested aerosol generators in specially built
suitcases to spray simulant bacteria on travelers at National Airport, Washington, D.C.
This experiment was considered a success, and the CIA conducted follow-on testing with
similar devices.
35 By the late 1960s, the U.S. BTW arsenal included numerous bacterial
and fungal plant pathogens and cobra venom, saxitoxin, and other toxins which were
developed for the Central Intelligence Agency.
E. THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION
During the late 1960s, the international community raised concerns regarding
biological weapons, and the ineffectiveness of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for preventing
BTW proliferation. As a result, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BWC) was developed. This treaty prohibits the development, possession, and
stockpiling of pathogens or toxins in "quantities that have no justification for
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes." 37 The BWC also prohibits the
development of delivery systems intended to disperse biological agents and requires
parties to destroy stocks of biological agents, delivery systems, and equipment within
nine months of ratifying the treaty. Transferring biological warfare technology or
expertise to other countries is also prohibited. The treaty was ratified in April 1972 and
went into effect in March 1975 with more than 100 signatory nations. Of particular note,
the BWC included no provisions to insure compliance. 38
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In 1970, President Nixon announced the termination of the U.S. offensive BTW
program. While welcomed by many on moral and ethical grounds, his decision was
primarily motivated by pragmatic reasons. Given the preponderance of conventional and
nuclear weapons available at the time, biological weapons were not considered essential
for national security. BTW were seen as untried, unpredictable, and potentially
hazardous for users as well as those under attack. In addition, the United States and
allied countries had a strategic interest in outlawing BTW programs to prevent the
proliferation of such a relatively low-cost WMD. By outlawing biological weapons,
decision makers believed that the arms race for WMD could be limited to more expensive
and technically challenging nuclear programs. 39
F. THE REDISCOVERY OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
During much of the Cold War, the United States considered nuclear weapons a
way to retaliate against attack by any strategic weapon, including chemical and biological
arms. Beginning with the emphasis on nuclear weapons in the doctrine of massive
retaliation, issues relating to BTW were downplayed and all but abandoned with the
signing of the BWC in 1972. Throughout the 1970s, biological warfare issues received
little, if any, attention by military planners and policy makers. 40 While BTW concerns
may have taken a back-seat in the West, other countries, including many signatories to
the BWC, continued covert BTW development programs.
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1. "Yellow Rain" in Southeast Asia
Starting in the mid-1970s, reports emerged from Laos that lethal chemical or
toxin weapons delivered by sprays, bombs and rockets were being used against the
Hmong resistance by Soviet proxy forces. Subsequently, similar attacks were reported in
Kampuchea and Afghanistan. Trichothecene toxins were identified at some of the attack
sites, and reported symptoms by survivors were consistent with exposure to agents of this
type, which were dubbed "yellow rain."41
2. The Soviet/Russian BTW program
Further evidence of continued Soviet BTW research appeared in 1979, when an
outbreak of anthrax occurred in Sverdlovsk, a city about 900 miles east of Moscow. A
nearby scientific facility was suspected to be conducting biological research, but the
Soviets denied that the lab was the source of the infection and blamed the outbreak on
contaminated black market meat. Russian President Boris Yeltsin admitted in 1992,
however, that the epidemic had been caused by an accidental release of anthrax spores
from a military compound where work on BTW was being pursued. The facility's air
filters had not been turned on that day. In addition, recently released pathological reports
confirm that the cause of death of the Sverdlovsk victims was pulmonary rather than
intestinal anthrax. In all, 66 deaths .were reported, making this the largest epidemic of
anthrax in humans on record.42
The Soviets continued their offensive BTW program under the aegis of
Biopreparat, a research bureau subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. During the 1970s
and 1980s, Biopreparat operated at least six research facilities and five production
24
facilities and employed up to 55,000 scientists and technicians. The program is now
controlled by Russia. While Yeltsin stated in 1992 that he planned to end further
offensive BTW research and production, the degree to which the program has been
reduced is uncertain. A 1995 report estimated that the Russian program continued to
employ 25,000 to 30,000 personnel.43
In addition, unconfirmed reports from Russian defectors formerly involved in the
BTW program suggest that Moscow was developing new classes of biological weapons,
including viral hemorrhagic fevers and genetically engineered bacteria. They specifically
mentioned creating a strain of plague that was resistant to multiple antibiotics and
engineered to overcome the protection provided by available vaccines. M
G. RECENT TECHNICAL ADVANCES
Since the 1980s, several advances in microbiological and pharmaceutical
technology have made BTW production easier, cheaper, and more concealable. Huge
research and production facilities employing large staffs like Pine Bluff, Unit 731 or
Biopreparat are no longer necessary to produce militarily significant BTW. Today any
nation with a modest pharmaceutical or fermentation industry could easily and cheaply
produce BTW. Mass-production methods for growing bacterial cultures that are widely
used in the commercial production of yogurt, yeast, and beer are the same used to make
pathogens and toxins.45 These technical developments have further complicated the
41
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already difficult problem of verifying compliance, by increasing the number of potential
production sites to be inspected and making it easier for the determined proliferant to
conceal clandestine BTW plants.
1. Advances in Bacterial Production
Although biological agents can be grown in ordinary laboratory flasks, efficient
production requires specialized fermenters. Until recently, commercial operations
producing bacteria relied on tank-type bioreactors holding thousands of liters of culture.
Over the past decade, however, the introduction of computer-controlled, "continuous-
flow" fermenters has increased productivity, making it possible to reduce the size of a
fermenter to about one one-thousandth of the size of a conventional batch fermenter
while still maintaining equivalent production. Real-time sensors and feedback loops
under microprocessor control optimize culture conditions, producing much higher yields
and better quality products than previously possible. Commercial bacteria production
now requires fewer trained personnel and uses smaller, more concealable equipment. A
developing country or substate actor could produce many small batches of BTW agents
in laboratory glassware without the need for high-technology fermenters.46
2. Advances in Toxin Production
Bacterial toxins are extracted from microbes produced through fermentation.
Botulinal toxin, for example, is derived from a culture of Clostridium botulinum bacteria,
which multiply rapidly under the proper fermentation conditions of temperature, acidity,
and the absence of oxygen. It takes three days to grow a culture of the cells, which then
release botulinal toxin into the surrounding medium. Japan's Unit 731 produced
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kilogram quantities of botulinal toxin in a fermenter approximately ten feet high and five
feet wide. Yields using today's technology could be much higher.47
3. Advances in Viral and Rikettsial Agent Production
Pathogenic viruses and rickettsiae are cultivated either in intact living tissue such
as chick embryos or mouse brains (which is highly labor-intensive), or in mammal cells
growing in a culture of cow or horse blood serum. Until recently, cultured mammalian
cells could only be grown on the inner surface of rotating glass bottles, which limited
production. Recently-developed "hollow-fiber technology" offers vastly more efficient
method of growing anchorage-dependent host cells. The cells attach to the outer surface
of thin fibers immersed in growth medium, and air is pumped through the fiber wall to
reach the cells. A single commercially available hollow-fiber bioreactor produces the
equivalent of several thousand one-liter roller bottles, and only occupies one-twentieth
the space of older equipment. 48
4. Advances in BTW Agent Stabilization
Once BTW agents have been produced, they must be processed into a form that
guarantees their survival in storage and delivery. Spore-forming organisms such as
anthrax naturally enter a state of suspended animation and can survive for decades in
their dormant form. Freeze-drying offers the best method for enhancing the stability of
non-spore forming BTW. A lyophilizer, commonly used in the pharmaceutical industry,
rapidly freezes a solution of bacteria and then dehydrates it under a constant vacuum to
form a dry cake. The dried material can then be milled into a fine dust which could be




easily inhaled. This technique is also applicable to toxins. If kept in cold storage,
lyophilized bacteria and toxins have an effective shelf life of months to years.49
Recent agricultural research on biological pesticides, such as the insect-killing
bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis, has provided information on how to stabilize freeze-
dried bacteria in liquid solution form using chemical additives and ultraviolet protectants.
Bacterial solutions of this type are compatible with existing agricultural aerosol
sprayers.
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Another advancement in stabilization technology, known as microencapsulation,
emulates natural spore formation by coating droplets of pathogens or toxin with a thin
coat of protective gelatin. The polymer coating protects the agent against environmental
stresses such as desiccation, sunlight, freezing and the mechanical stresses of
dissemination. Once in the lungs, the polymer coating dissolves, releasing the agent.
Microencapsulation is routinely used in the production of carbonless carbon paper, where
ink droplets are coated in this manner. 51
5. Improvements in Integration With Delivery Systems
A biological pathogen or toxin is of little military utility unless it can be placed on
a target. BTW can be delivered through intermediary organisms such as ticks or fleas,
used to contaminate water or food supplies, or spread through the air. Atmospheric
dispersal is the preferred method since most BTW agents are easily converted into either
dry powder or aerosols, and are most virulent when infection is accomplished through
inhalation.' Aerosol delivery systems range in complexity and effectiveness from truck-
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mounted agricultural sprayers to specialized cluster munitions carried on ballistic
missiles.
The size of an aerosol particle is critical to both its atmospheric stability and its
military effectiveness. Whereas larger particles tend to settle out of the air rapidly,
microscopic particles between one and five microns in diameter form an aerosol which
remains airborne for a long time. Aerosolized BTW generally do not penetrate the skin
and do not represent a significant contact hazard; instead, they infect only if inhaled into
the lungs. Particle size is also critical for respiratory infection. Almost all particles
larger than five microns in diameter are trapped in the phlegm and passages of the upper
respiratory tract, while particles smaller than one micron in diameter are exhaled without
being absorbed by lung tissue. Only particles between one and four microns are small
enough to reach the alveoli, bypassing the body's natural filtering and defense
mechanisms.52
H. RENEWED INTEREST IN BTW
Technological developments and the spread of expertise have brought the
acquisition of potentially devastating BTW within the reach of over 100 nations. The
impotence of any control regime to stem BTW proliferation is evident: there are nearly
twice as many BTW equipped states today as there were in 1972 when the BWC was
ratified.
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These factors, combined with the relative successes of nuclear and chemical
arms control have made BTW an increasingly attractive option for both state and substate
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actors. Several recent examples demonstrate that despite efforts to stem the development
and use of BTW, interest is acquiring BTW programs is growing.
1. The Iraqi BTW Program
The case of Iraq, a signatory to the BWC, demonstrates the ease in which a nation
with modest means can clandestinely develop a robust BTW program. After initial work
in the late 1970s, Iraq's biological warfare program started in earnest in 1985. By the end
of Operation Desert Storm in April 1991, Iraqi scientists had studied the BTW potential
of bacteria, viruses, toxins, and a crop destroying fungus.
In 1987, production of anthrax cultured from samples obtained from France and
the United States began at Salman Pak and Al Hakam Single Cell Protein Production
Plant. Eventually 8,000 liters of concentrated anthrax solution was produced and three-
quarters of this solution was weaponized. Clostridium perfringrens (the cause of gas
gangrene) was also studied at Al Hakam, but the Iraqis claim it was never weaponized.54
One crop-destroying fungal strain, wheat cover smut, was evaluated for weapons
use in 1985 at Salman Pak. Smut spores were field tested against wheat plants and
proved lethal to the crop. This implies that Iraqi leaders may have had plans to use BTW
for economic warfare.
Beginning in 1990, researchers at the Foot and Mouth Disease Center at Al Manal
investigated five viruses for their potential utility as incapacitating weapons. Three of the
agents, enterovirus 17, human rotavirus, and camel pox, were mass produced before the
53
Kadlec, "Biological Weapons Control: Prospects and Implications for the Future," 351.
54Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?" Journal of the
American Medical Association, 6 August 1997, 418.
30
plan was abandoned later in the year. Camel pox may have been considered an "ethnic
weapon" since individuals raised in the presence of camels develop natural immunity. 55
Substantial attention was also given to weaponizing aflatoxin, botulinum toxin,
ricin, and tricothecenes. Iraq adapted 250- and 400-pound bombs and 122-mm rockets to
carry BTW. Most significantly, 25 Al Hussein ballistic missiles were fitted with
biological warheads. Of these, 13 carried botulinum, 10 were filled with aflatoxin, and 2
with anthrax. All reportedly were deployed in railway tunnels and bunkers along the
Tigris River.56
In addition, the Iraqis possessed several hundred modern Italian-made pesticide
dispersal systems that were fitted with sprayer nozzles capable of generating aerosols of
the one to five micrometer range, which is optimal for BTW. Some sprayers and
appropriate holding tanks were installed on aircraft and land vehicles. In 1990, the Iraqis
also modified a MIG-2 1 fighter plane to function as a remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) and
equipped it with a 2200 liter belly tank and spray mechanism. In a field test carried out
in January 1991, the RPV sprayed a biological simulant solution over a practice target
range, but the exact results of this experiment are unknown. 57
Soon after Iraq had accepted a cease-fire under United Nations Security Council
Resolution 687 in April 1991, BTW program personnel reportedly were ordered to
destroy all biological agents and munitions containing BTW. Stockpiles of agent were
reportedly treated with formaldehyde and dumped onto bare ground near the Al Hakam
perimeter. Iraqi personnel supposedly incinerated munitions in pits, destroyed them with
conventional munitions, and tossed some into the Tigris River. Although some whole
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and fragmented munitions have been recovered, no conclusive evidence exists that BTW
stores or munitions were all destroyed. The Iraqis destroyed the Salman Pak facility
several days before the arrival of the first UNSCOM inspection team in 1991. The Al
Hakam plant and the Al Manal facility were destroyed under UNSCOM direction two
years later.
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The experience of UNSCOM in Iraq has highlighted the necessity of intrusive
inspection measures to ensure weapons control agreement compliance. Iraq hid from
UNSCOM inspectors information concerning their BTW program for four years after the
Gulf War. Despite comprehensive mandatory declarations, numerous challenge
inspections to 80 biocapable facilities, including breweries, food production plants,
pharmaceutical plants, and medical laboratories, UNSCOM found "no incriminating
evidence that would identify any of the sites as linked to a proscribed biological weapons
program."' Only after the defection of the late Lieutenant General Hussein Kamel
Hassan, would the program suspected by intelligence officials be proven. The U.S.
intelligence community estimates that Iraq could reconstitute its biological weapons
program in a matter of weeks once sanctions are removed. 60
2. The Rajneesh Cult
In 1981, followers of Indian guru Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh purchased a large
ranch in Wasco County, Oregon, to build a new international headquarters for the sect.
Construction of the commune was controversial. Cultural values and land-use issues
were the major areas of conflict. Part of the ranch was incorporated as the city of
57
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"Rajneeshpuram," but the charter was challenged in the courts, limiting new construction.
Commune members believed that the outcome of the 6 November 1984 elections for
Wasco County commissioners would have an important impact on further land use
decisions. They sought to influence the vote. 61
Cult members with a knowledge of microbiology working in clandestine
laboratories in the Rajneeshpuram medical center, produced cultures of Salmonella
Typhimurium, and contaminated salad bars and coffee cream in at least ten local
restaurants. Their objective was to limit voter turnout and skew the upcoming election in
their favor, and this operation was to be a test of the capability. A total of 75 1 people
were incapacitated to some degree with Salmonella gastroenteritis following the attacks.
In addition, plans were made to contaminate the county water supply. Despite extensive
investigation by national and local agencies, the source of poisoning went unrecognized
until evidence was discovered in an unrelated criminal investigation more than a year
later. Clinic records seized indicated that the laboratory had obtained the Salmonella
culture legally through a Rockville, Maryland biological supplies company.62
3. Aum Shinrikyo
Although achieving notoriety after their 1995 attack on a Tokyo subway using the
chemical nerve agent sarin, the apocalyptic Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo also developed
an ambitious biological weapons program. The program was directed by Seiichi Endo, a
28-year old former genetic engineer from Kyoto University's Viral Research Center.
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Without arousing the suspicions of Japanese police or import control officials, Endo and
his group were able to obtain the equipment and materials to produce a range of BTW.
In early 1990, Aum began production of botulinum toxin in a biocontainment
laboratory within their headquarters compound near Mount Fuji. Concurrent with toxin
production, Aum's scientists also developed antitoxin using horse serum at a second
biolab near Mount Aso which included a stable for donor animals.63 Aum's early
attempts to produce botulinal toxin were plagued by quality control problems, probably
the contamination of the anaerobic culture vessels by oxygen. As a result, the first two
attempted attacks using the toxin were unsuccessful. In the first, in April of 1990, three
trucks configured with aerosol spray devices disguised as exhaust pipes were driven
repeatedly through the area surrounding the Japanese parliamental building where a full
session of the Diet was meeting.64 The convoy then drove south to attack the American
naval installations at Yokohama and Yokosuka. This marked the first time that BTW had
been used by terrorists against the U.S. Government.65 Aum attempted a second
unsuccessful "drive-by" botulinum attack in June, 1993, against the wedding of Crown
Prince Naruhito and Masako Owada. 66
Also in June 1993 a new biolab was completed in an eight-story building in
eastern Tokyo. In this facility, Aum technicians cultured anthrax bacteria and attempted
to disperse a solution of spores using a steam generator and powerful fan mounted on the
roof of the building. Luckily, the group again was thwarted by manufacturing problems,
and the attack produced only minor sickness and nausea in the immediate population.
"Kaplan, The Cult at the End of the World, 53.
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Experts have speculated that the process of incubating the bacteria into their spore form
was likely unsuccessful, sparing metropolitan Tokyo a potentially devastating epidemic.
Other pathogens were also investigated by Aum's biotechnicians. In 1992, during
the height of the Ebola virus epidemic in Zaire, Aum "missionaries" were dispatched on
an "African Salvation Tour" to attempt to collect cultures of the pathogen. Three
hospitals that treated Ebola victims were visited and it is possible that the "missionaries"
might have obtained viable cultures of the virus. Endo also cultured North Queensland
fever, a highly contagious rickettsia that causes extreme flu-like conditions for up to three
months. 68
Aum also began a genetic engineering program to modify the molecular
characteristics of biological agents to make them easier to handle, cheaper to produce,
harder to detect, and nearly impossible to cure. These techniques rely heavily on cutting-
edge computer-controlled equipment that is produced primarily in the United States.
Working through an Aum front company in New York, Endo was able in 1995 to
purchase advanced molecular design software from companies in Oregon and St. Louis,
and Silicon Graphics workstations and other hardware from Biosym Technologies in San
Diego.69 Additionally, Aum computer experts, working through the Internet,
downloaded the entire Protein Data Bank from the Brookhaven National Laboratory in
New York. The database is a repository of information on more than 3,000 proteins,
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nucleic acids, and other organic molecules, including the chemical breakdowns of various
toxins.
Aum was developing several avenues for BTW dispersal. In addition to the
ineffective automobile sprayers, front companies purchased a Russian Mi- 17 HIP
helicopter, a blimp, and two drone helicopters capable of carrying 18 pound payloads.
According to the manufacturer of the drones, which were designed for film production,
the Aum buyers spoke of plans to convert them to "remote-controlled crop dusters." Two
members were sent to private flight school in Opa Locka, Florida. 71
Using the studies prepared by the U.S. Army and CIA in the 1960s as a
framework, Aum constructed a number of prototype BTW dispensers fitted into
briefcases. The bacteria were held in solution in vinyl tubes, which were mounted on
small ceramic diaphragms. Powered by batteries, the device turned the solution into
steam, which was then blown from the briefcase by a small electric fan. The system was
triggered by ultrasonic vibrations, so that a passing train would activate the mechanism
and release a spray of botulinum toxin, which by this time had been perfected.
On March 15, 1995, an Aum member placed briefcases at three ticket gates near
the Kasumigaseki Station of the Tokyo subway line and departed. All three cases were
found and picked up by station-masters as lost property. Two of the cases malfunctioned,
but one activated and dispersed a steam cloud as designed. Luckily, the Aum member
who placed the devices had suffered a guilty conscience and removed the toxin prior to
leaving them.72
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I. EXPLAINING THE REDISCOVERY OF BTW
Several explanations for the rediscovery of BTW have been suggested. Billy
Richardson and John P. Carrico blame uncertainties resulting from the disintegration of
the Soviet Union. They argue that in the past, the U.S. military served as a deterrent to
the use of chemical or biological weapons in regional conflicts. The ongoing post-Cold
War drawdown of U.S. military capabilities, however, has reduced the credibility of
global preventative measures and nuclear deterrence. In the context of these changes,
they believe that the likelihood of a potential BTW user to doubt U.S. intervention is
greater. In their view, this trend heightens the possibility that regional biological warfare
will occur.
73
Others, including Graham Pearson, former director of Britain's chemical and
biological defense program, believe that the successes of the international community in
controlling the spread of other forms of WMD have made BTW more attractive to
aspiring proliferants.
74 The effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)
and the recently ratified verification regime for the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) will make future acquisition of these weapons increasingly difficult for future
groups and developing nations. This factor, in combination with the impotence of the
BWC, makes BTW even cheaper and easier to acquire in relative terms.
A third argument, made by Richard Danzig, David Huxsoll, and others is that
technological advances of the past decade, and the growing availability of relevant
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technical training and information, make the acquisition of BTW by aspiring states or
other entities more likely. Since the expertise and materials necessary to produce BTW
are dual-use, advancements in genetics, pharmaceutical, and vaccine research could be
easily applied toward offensive weapons programs.75
The rediscovery of BTW is most likely due to a combination of these three
factors. A less predictable international security environment along with technical
developments that make production easier and more concealable, and the lack of
effective measures to detect clandestine programs, have brought the issue of BTW
proliferation from obscurity into high level policy discussions.
4 Graham S. Pearson, "Biological Weapons: A Priority Concern," ed. Kathleen C. Bailey,
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IV. STRENGTHENING THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS
CONVENTION
To strengthen the BWC, signatories have met in a series of discussions to identify
confidence-building measures and most recently, verification procedures to increase
transparency and encourage compliance. Using the CWC verification protocol as a
framework, negotiators in the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts are working to
overcome differences arising from concerns that intrusive inspections will compromise
military and industrial security. The PRC has been an active participant in the BWC
review process and claims to have never possessed biological weapons. U.S. intelligence
agencies suspect, however, that the PRC is in violation of the BWC, and policy makers
should consider how American participation in the verification protocol could affect the
BWC and BTW policy of suspected proliferants such as China.
A. REVIEW CONFERENCES
A series of Review Conferences have been convened in 1981, 1986, 1991, and
1996 to improve operations of the BWC. States Parties at the First and Second Review
Conferences agreed to the following seven confidence-building measures (CBMs):
1
.
Information exchange concerning laboratories with the highest
safety level (BL4) or which specialize in research into defensive
measures against the hostile use of microorganisms and toxins;
2. Information exchange concerning unusual outbreaks of disease
or poisoning;
3. Information exchange concerning research publications with
direct relevance to the Convention;
39
4. Support for contacts between researchers active in the area of
protective and prophylactic measures against biological agents;
5. Declaration of legislation, regulations, and other measures;
6. Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive
biological research since 1 January 1946.
7. Declaration of human vaccine production facilities.
These measures were designed to improve transparency through pledges and provision of
data on national programs. As CBMs, they were and remain voluntary with no provision
for verification.
B. VEREX CONFERENCES
At the Third Review Conference, delegates decided that CBMs alone had been
ineffective in controlling proliferation and proposed crafting a verification regime to help
detect or discourage clandestine BTW production. The Conference then established a
group of government experts to identify technical verification measures. This group,
called "VEREX" (for "Verification Experts") met four times between 1992 and 1993 and
identified a list of possible verification measures in seven categories. Off-site measures
included information monitoring, data exchange, and remote sensing. Measures in the
on-site categories included:
Exchange visits
Interviewing of facility personnel
Visual inspection
Identification of key equipment
Auditing of facility records
76OHver Thranert, "Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: An Urgent Task,"
Contemporary Security Policy, December 1996, 352.
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• Sampling and identification
• Medical examination of facility personnel
• Continuous monitoring by instruments
• Continuous monitoring by personnel
In its final report presented in 1994, VEREX concluded that while no single
measure alone could confirm compliance or noncompliance, combinations of measures
might increase the probability of observing the behavior of a suspected violator.77
C. AD HOC GROUP DISCUSSIONS
The Convention established an Ad Hoc Group (AUG) in 1995 to draft proposals
for a legally binding protocol incorporating these verification measures. The AHG has
met five times since 1995, and in its most recent meeting in September 1997, produced a
"rolling text" proposal. Multilateral negotiations are ongoing as to what combination of
verification measures will be accepted.
1. The CWC as a Framework for Verification
The protocol measures under negotiation have been modeled after those of the
Chemical Weapons Convention and fall into three primary categories. Declarations and
annual reports state BTW capable facilities, and imports and exports of scheduled
materials and equipment. Routine inspections are conducted at declared government and
private commercial facilities. These are intrusive and given on short notice, with
multinational inspection teams arriving within 48 hours. Challenge inspections may be
given at any time at any facility, declared or otherwise. Inspection is also short notice,
41
and conducted within 120 hours of request by a suspecting party. Challenge inspections
are subject to a "red light filter." Once requested by a suspecting state party, a challenge
inspection will be conducted unless countered by a three-quarters majority vote of
78
member states.
Since ratification in April 1997 the Technical Secretariat of the CWC has
conducted 134 routine inspections in 21 countries. 79 To date, however, the U.S. Congress
has yet to pass legislation needed to implement fully the conditions of the Convention.
Without the CWC implementing legislation, the U.S. government does not have the legal
basis to require American chemical companies to comply and is therefore in technical
violation of the treaty. 80
Whatever BWC monitoring measures are agreed to will be equally binding
between all participating states. Operating under a kind of "golden rule" for treaty
negotiations, members of the Ad Hoc Group must be prepared to accept the same types of
intrusive monitoring they wish to apply to others. Each nation must therefore find the
right balance between a regime that is intrusive enough to ensure that other countries are
following the rules and one that allows them to safeguard sensitive industrial and
national-security information.
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2. Verification techniques
Three analytical methods are employed in inspections to identify disease-causing
bacteria and viruses. In bioassay, scientists cultivate a collected sample and identify the
grown microbes using chemical or physiological tests. Immunoassay employs specific
antibodies to detect unique molecular markers on the surface of target microorganisms
and protein toxins. Genetic analysis uses "gene probes" - short strands of synthetic DNA
- that bind to complementary DNA sequences unique to each microbial species. Gene
probes are often employed in conjunction with a technique called the polymerase chain
reaction (PCR), which multiplies a given DNA sequence more than a million fold. With
the aid of PCR, scientists can quickly identify a species of bacteria even if only a few
dozen cells are present in the sample - avoiding the need to culture them into large
colonies over a period of days or weeks.
These analytical techniques occasionally produce "false positives" when a genetic
marker appears in both a pathogenic agent and a harmless microorganism. For positive
confirmation, multiple techniques would then be used. False positives can also be
generated by the detection of small quantities of naturally occurring pathogen (anthrax
occurs naturally in soil) that may be tracked into production facilities.83
3. Debate Within the United States
While some U.S. authorities may support on-site inspections, the multi-billion
dollar U.S. pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries fear intrusive verification will
open their facilities to industrial espionage and loss of proprietary information. This is a
legitimate concern and industrial groups such as Pharmaceutical Research and
43
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) strongly oppose on-site verification measures and
lobby to promote their interest in limiting intrusive inspections.
84 The stakes are high for
a number of reasons:
• The cost of bringing a pharmaceutical product to market runs between
$350 and $500 million.
• According to the PHRMA, pharmaceutical manufacturers spend 19.4
percent of sales on R&D, compared to an average across all industries
of 3.8 percent.
• U.S. drug companies lead the world in innovation, accounting for 36
percent of global pharmaceutical research and development. 86
• The cost of suspending production operations for inspections has been
estimated to cost approximately $400,000 per day.
Biotechnology-based medicines represent a major growth sector for the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry. In 1995, U.S. firms and organization were responsible for about
80 percent of patents for genetically engineered health-care and pharmaceutical products
issued by the U.S. Patent Office. From 1989 to 1996, the number of biopharmaceuticals
being developed by U.S. companies to treat diseases ranging from the common cold to
cancer soared from 80 to 284. Over the same period, the number of U.S. companies
developing new-generation biotechnology drugs more than doubled, from 45 to 1 13. 88
The pharmaceutical industry is keenly competitive, and industrial espionage is a
concern for companies. The organisms, most processes, and equipment are not patented,
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primarily as a measure to keep them secret. Thus, there is much vulnerability to
industrial espionage. U.S. pharmaceutical companies exercise careful control over who is
allowed to enter production facilities, and stringent external security at drug research
on
laboratories.
Biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies fear that foreign inspectors visiting
their plants could gain insight into their production techniques or even obtain a covert
sample of a genetically engineered microorganism, whose proprietary DNA sequences
could then be copied. Such information is worth vast sums. The genetically engineered
bacterium that produces human insulin, for example, is valued at more than $1 billion,
according to its developer, Lilly Research Laboratories, in Indianapolis.90
The nature of the measures proposed in the Ad Hoc Group does pose a potential
risk of compromising proprietary secrets to both domestic competitors and foreign
nationals present in the inspection teams. In fact, many foreign governmental entities,
including the PRC Ministry of State Security, target foreign high technology and
frequently use academics and scientists traveling abroad as intelligence collectors. 91
Experts of the caliber participating in BWC sponsored inspection teams would be ideally
placed to steal technical secrets.
The pharmaceutical industry also worries that anthrax spores or other pathogens
naturally present in the environment may be tracked into a vaccine plant on workers
shoes and be detected by international inspectors - raising suspicion of a BWC violation
and damaging the firm's reputation. "The release of erroneous information implying
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serious wrongdoing could cause irreparable harm to a company's relationship with its
shareholders and the general public," observes William Muth, a scientist at Lilly.92
Most pharmaceutical industry representatives endorse the concept of "managed
access," an approach developed for on-site inspections under the Chemical Weapons
Convention. In this procedure, the inspection team and the host country negotiate the
amount of access to be provided to sensitive areas of the inspected site. For example,
facility managers might turn off computers, lock up documents, place cloth shrouds over
items of production equipment considered proprietary, and specify where and when
samples may be taken. In return for such limits on access, the inspected party must make
"every reasonable effort" to provide alternative means of addressing the inspectors'
compliance concerns. Some arms-control analysts doubt that managed access will be
effective in catching BWC violators because it assumes a large degree of good faith and
cooperation on the part of the inspected party.93
4. Debate within the Ad Hoc Group
Following the publication of the VEREX recommendations in 1994, debate over
the nature of a BWC verification protocol was sharply divided among members of the
Convention. The United States and Japan favored elaboration of some form of
transparency regime with enhanced compulsory CBMs but not a full-blown verification
regime. Most European states and Canada, New Zealand and Australia advocated
negotiation of a verification protocol that would include mandatory on-site inspection.
The "nonaligned" or "developing group" of states led by Russia and India supported
91
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enhanced verification in principle, but expressed wariness in establishing a costly and
intrusive inspection regime. The People's Republic of China stood with the nonaligned
states in this regard, but was more vocal in its opposition to on-site inspection measures.
Current debate within the Ad Hoc Group remains split. The "Western Group," led
by the European Community continues to favor a program allowing on-site inspections.
The "non-aligned group of nations" (NAG) led by Russia, China, and India advocate a
non-intrusive regime. The United States and Japan have been criticized recently for a
perceived lack of leadership in the negotiation process.96 The deadline for presenting a
protocol for final acceptance, originally set for 1998, has been pushed back to the end of
200 1.97
D. CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN THE REVIEW PROCESS
The People's Republic of China refused to join the initial BWC in 1972 due to what
it perceived as a double standard imposed by the Convention upon the developing world.
The Chinese characterize the early years of arms control primarily as an effort by the
United States and the Soviet Union to prevent other nations from obtaining advanced
military technology.
98 Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs Sha Zukang called the
original convention a "fraud of sham disarmament" concocted by the two superpowers
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under the pretext of preventing proliferation to block legitimate economic and
technological exchanges of other nations."
China acceded conditionally to the BWC in 1984. It considers the Convention to
be legally binding only with other signatory parties, and non-binding in regard to any
enemy states whose armed forces or allies violate the Convention's provisions. Despite
this stipulation, it denies having a BTW program and has been an active participant in the
Review Conferences since joining in 1984. Official PRC statements enthusiastically
endorse strengthening the BWC but negotiators in the Ad Hoc Group have opposed
intrusive inspection measures and legally binding disclosures of past activity as part of a
verification protocol.
E. THE PROBLEM: SUSPICION OF PRC VIOLATIONS
The PRC denies ever having developed biological weapons: "Having been
caused great harm by biological weapons, China has all along stood for the complete
prohibition and thorough destruction of biological weapons, and has never developed,
produced, stockpiled or otherwise acquired or retained biological agents, toxins, or
weapons equipment or means of delivery for them." 10° Despite these claims, U.S.
intelligence organizations strongly suspect that China is in violation of the BWC. In his
unclassified 25 November 1997 brief Proliferation: Threat and Response, Secretary of
Defense Cohen stated that China possesses an advanced biotechnology infrastructure and
the biocontoinment facilities necessary to perform research and development on lethal
""Official tells U.N. to stop double standard of some weapons agreements," Xinhua News
Agency, 14 October 1997.
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pathogens. In its annual report, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control
Agreements, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency also stated:
The United States believes that China had an offensive BW
program prior to 1984 when it became a Party to the BWC. The
United States believes that based on available evidence, China
maintained an offensive BW program throughout most of the
1980s. The offensive BW program included the development,
production, stockpiling or other acquisition or maintenance of
biological warfare agents. China's CBM-mandated declarations
have not resolved U.S. concerns about this program and there are
strong indications that China probably maintains its offensive
program. The United States, therefore, believes that in the years
after its accession to the BWC, China was not in compliance with
its BWC obligations and that it is highly probable that it remains
noncompliant with these obligations. 102
The Chinese adamantly deny the U.S. intelligence community's assessment, dismissing it
as unfounded.
China has the distinction of being one of the few nations ever subjected to BTW.
As a member of the BWC since 1984, Chinese delegations have played an important role
in the process of strengthening the Convention and in discussions over verification. Most
importantly, the PRC is believed to maintain a mature BTW production capability,
stockpiles of BTW weapons, and is suspected of transferring technology and information
relevant to their production. The contradiction between the Chinese official position on
BTW and their suspected active BTW program poses a challenge for U.S. policy makers.
It is in the best interests of the United States and its East Asian allies that the PRC
comply with the BWC and assist in controlling BTW proliferation in the region.
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V. BWC INSPECTION AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Debate continues within the United States over whether the BWC inspection
protocol under consideration in the Ad Hoc Group should be accepted. With the deadline
for finalization pushed back to 2001, American approval is uncertain. 103 How might
U.S. acceptance, or rejection of a BWC inspection protocol affect Chinese participation
in the regime?
To answer this question, this chapter identifies the institutions involved in the
formation of Chinese BTW arms control policy, their objectives, past positions on
commensurate issues, and relative influence. While information on Chinese foreign
policy formation is fragmentary, Michael Swaine's work provides a useful analytic
framework. The Swaine model of Chinese bureaucratic decision making states that
institutional subarenas formulate different aspects of foreign policy. Nonproliferation
policy is one area that overlaps the defense, foreign policy, and intelligence subarenas,
requiring these groups to reach consensus. Past behavior of these subarenas shows that
each considers different aspects of the external environment when calculating the costs
and benefits of a particular policy.
Ongoing negotiations in the BWC and its pending inspection protocol bring
interests of the defense policy, foreign policy, and strategic research, analysis and
intelligence subarenas into conflict. China has shown a reluctance to accept intrusive
inspections in the past, suggesting the primacy of defense over economic and political
concerns. U.S. participation in the inspection protocol, however, alters the constraints and
103
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pressures exerted on PRC bureaucratic entities, and may affect a change in Chinese BWC
and BTW policy.
A. SWAINE'S MODEL
Swaine identifies the leaders and processes governing the formation of Chinese
national security policy. According to his model, the PRC national security policy
"arena" is composed of four distinct, but closely related institutional "subarenas," each
responsible for its own set of policy functions. The National Strategic Objectives (NSO)
subarena focuses on broad principles and goals guiding the entire national security policy
arena. The Foreign Policy (FP) subarena centers on civilian foreign affairs and
diplomatic relations. The Defense Policy (DP) subarena includes defense and security
related activities. Finally, the Strategic Research, Analysis, and Intelligence (SRAI)
subarena supports leaders of the other three subarenas with analysis and intelligence
assessments.
Unlike the United States and Russia, which have a long history of participation in
arms control regimes, China lacks a single government agency (comparable to the ACDA
in the United States) with a mandate to specialize in these issues. A number of
organizations within the PRC bureaucracy play a role in formulating the Chinese position
on nonproliferation.
1 BWC and BTW policy formation therefore involves the interplay
of these subarenas and the personalities who head them. Linkages and influence
between the four subarenas vary considerably. Vertical connections between the NSO
subarena and both FP and DP organizations are relatively strong, while lateral linkages
52
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B. THE NATIONAL STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES SUBARENA
The National Strategic Objectives Subarena is composed of senior party, state,
and military leaders. Ultimate authority rests with an informal collective leadership of
four individuals: Jiang Zemin (as party general secretary and head of the Central Military
Commission); Premier Zhu Ronghi (responsible for state affairs and head of the foreign
policy system); and two powerful People's Liberation Army (PLA) elders, Admiral Liu
Huaqing and General Zhang Zhen. They are supported by the Politburo Standing
Committee (PBSC) and the most influential retired and semi-retired cadres of the
revolutionary generation. These individuals determine China's national strategic
objectives, and have authority over foreign policy including arms control agreements. 106
1. Chinese National Strategic Objectives
Since the late 1970s, post-Mao leaders have generally adhered to a pragmatic
rather than an ideological view of foreign and security policies. According to Robert
Sutter, Chinese leaders must now seek to foster a better economic life for the people of
China to justify their continued monopoly of political power. They cannot rely, as Mao
did, on revolutionary prestige, or on the appeal of communist ideology. Furthermore,
China now depends on foreign trade, and related foreign investment and assistance, for
its economic development. To buttress their political survival, post-Mao leaders must
consider how foreign policy will affect the continued trade, investment, and assistance so
important to Chinese economic well being. 107
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Faced with the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Gulf
War, and the danger of the "new world order," the Fourteenth Party Congress in late
1992 declared that bipolarity had ended and that the international system was moving
toward multipolarity. 108 In the Chinese view, this structural shift has been accompanied
by a redefinition of their concept of national power. China's current strategic objectives
are reflected in the "Four Modernizations" of industry, agriculture, science and
technology, and national defense, through a program of incremental, market-led
economic restructuring and administrative reform. Key to the modernizations is the
concept of "comprehensive national strength" (CNS) composed of China's natural
resources, economic prowess, external trade and investment, scientific advancement,
military capabilities, and diplomatic efficacy. Under the Four Modernizations, military
improvements are subordinated to the establishment of strong economic, technological,
political, and social capabilities.
2. The Forum for Policy Formation
Chinese statements on internal and external objectives suggest a clear linkage
between domestic, economic, and foreign security interests. As the final releasing
authority for foreign policy, including arms control agreements, the NSO subarena is the
forum where defense, foreign affairs, and intelligence community leaders must reach
concensus over which course of BTW/BWC policy will best serve Chinese strategic
objectives.
Samuel S. Kim, China's Questfor Security in the Post-Cold War World (Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1996), 6.
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C. THE FOREIGN POLICY SUBARENA
The foreign policy subarena, composed of civilian agencies of the State Council
and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is responsible for political and diplomatic
relations with other nations and several quasi-governmental interactions including
multilateral discussions, foreign economic, scientific, and technological activities (trade
negotiations, technology transfer agreements, and large equipment sales), and
international security activities such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Regional Forum (ARF) and arms control negotiations. 110
1. Functional Elements of the FP Subarena
The leadership, structures, and processes of the foreign policy subarena are more
regularized and bureaucratic than those of the national strategic objectives arena. Major
actors include six ministries and two coordinating mechanisms: the CCP Central
Committee's Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG); and within the FALSG, the
State Council Office of Foreign Affairs (OFA). 111 Primary leadership authority over
foreign policy is exercised by Zhu Ronghi. As State Council Premier, and head of the
FALSG, Zhu is responsible for developing policy, overseeing the activities of the MoFA,
and coordinating the activities of the various foreign policy bureaucracies. 112
109
Senior Colonel Wang Zhongchun, PLA, The Changes and Development of China's Peripheral
Security Environment and its Defense Policy (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College,
1996), 36.
110
Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking, 20.
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Ibid., 22.
11 Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking, 23.
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2. Chinese Foreign Policy Objectives
China's current foreign policy is pragmatic and is keyed to maintaining an
external environment conducive to positive political and economic relations. The FP
subarena is heavily involved in BWC negotiations and addresses the inspection protocol
based on how it serves or hinders its political and economic objectives. Good relations
with the West, and especially the United States, are especially important: (1) to assure the
continued success of economic reform, which is heavily dependent on foreign trade,
technology, and investment; (2) to avoid excessive external pressures on China's military
modernization program; (3) to prevent the possible emergence of a more military
assertive Japan; (4) to minimize U.S. incentives for providing military assistance to
Taiwan; and (5) to resolve issues of mutual concern such as arms proliferation in East
Asia.
113
Several recent initiatives by the FP subarena demonstrate the primacy of trade,
technology, and foreign investment in its overall strategy. In a 25 November 1997
speech to the 5 th Informal Leader's Meeting of APEC in Vancouver, Chinese President
Jiang Zemin stated that "economic and technological cooperation and trade and
investment liberalization are closely linked and should support each other." He cited
advances in science and technology as the decisive factor in narrowing the gap between
developing and developed nations and stressed that "strengthened scientific and
technological exchanges as well as technological cooperation and transfer will greatly
facilitate the process of trade and investment liberalization." 114 To this end, Jiang
Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking, 20.
I14
"President Jiang Calls for Wide Cooperation," in PRC Newsletter (Washington, D.C.: PRC
Embassy, December 1997, identifier 199725, accessed 2 February 1998); available from http://www.chma-
embassy.org/Press/Newsletters.htm, Internet.
57
proposed the creation of an "Agenda for Science and Technology Industry Cooperation
into the 21
st
Century." This plan would remove trade barriers to accelerate the transfer of
high technology to developing nations, and "rationalize" the intellectual property rights
(IPR) regime and its conditions of patent transfer.
Furthermore, to attract investment and technology, the Ministry of Foreign Trade
and Economic Cooperation (MoFTEC) granted tax exemptions in December 1997 for
foreign ventures utilizing modern agricultural technology and advanced industrial
equipment. According to Minister Wu Yi, "the goal of tax readjustments initiated by the
State Council is to attract increasing foreign investment, encourage the import of more
advanced foreign technology and equipment, enhance the industrial structure and
technological advancement, and maintain rapid, sound and sustainable national economic
development." 115 MoFTEC's efforts to attract investment and technology appear to be
having some success:
• According to the State Planning Commission, China has approved
300,000 overseas-backed businesses involving approximately 200
billion U.S. dollars of investment. It claims that overseas investment
makes up more than 20 percent of the country's total expenditures in
fixed assets.
116
• China used more $51.9 billion of direct foreign investment in 1997. 117
• A total of 166 overseas financial institutions now run their operations
in China with total assets of $30.6 billion.
1I5
"China Readjusts Tax on Imported Equipment," in PRC Newsletter (Washington, D.C.: PRC
Embassy, 30 December, identifier 199801, accessed 2 February 1998): available from http://www.ch.ina-
embassy.org/Press/Newsletters.htm, Internet.
116
"China To Adopt New Policies for Foreign Investment," in PRC Newsletter (Washington,
D.C.; PRC Embassy, 2 January 1998, identifier 199802, accessed 2 February 1998); available
http://www.china-embassy.org/Press/Newsletters.htm, Internet.
117 PRC Newsletter (Washington, D.C.; PRC Embassy, March 1998, identifier 199803, accessed
10 April 1998); available http://www.china-embassy.org/Press/Newsletters.htm, Internet.
118 PRC Newsletter (Washington, D.C.; PRC Embassy, February 1998, identifier 199802, accessed
10 April 1998); available http://www.china-embassy.org/Press/Newsletters.htm, Internet.
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• Overseas-funded enterprises in China now provide 17 million jobs, 10
percent of the non-agricultural working force. 11
• James W. Jarrett, vice-president of the Intel Corporation, believes that
China will be Intel's third-largest market after the United States and
Japan within a few years. He reports that China is its fastest growing
market and that Chinese demand for personal computers has been
increasing at an average annual rate of 40 percent.
• U.S. hard drive manufacturer, Seagate Technology International,
expects to double its production and sales in China in 1998 compared
to last year. The company currently has two production bases in
China, with a total investment of $90 million. Seagate occupies more
than half of China's hard disk drive market. 121
• Last year, the United States became China's second largest trade
partner, with total two-way trade reaching $42.8 billion and American
capital investment reaching $14.3 billion. Imports included targeted
high technology such as aircraft, production capital, and
telecommunications equipment.
• China has, since 1993, ranked as the world's second largest investment
target following the United States. 122
Concurrent with promotion of trade and investment are FP subarena efforts to
acquire new technology. Within the Ad Hoc Group of the BWC, China leads the non-
aligned group of nations (NAG) in demands for technological and economic concessions
under Article X in exchange for acceptance of inspection provisions. Article X states that
participating countries "undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological
119 PRC Newsletter (Washington, D.C.; PRC Embassy, February 1998, identifier 199802, accessed
10 April 1998); available http://www.china-embassy.org/Press/Newsletters.htm, Internet.
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information for the use of bacteriological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes." 123
Among Chinese demands are the creation of a biotechnology databank, assistance with
acquisition of instruments, equipment, and technologies developed by BWC members,
aid in establishing national defense research centers and training of personnel in bio-
defense activities, and elimination of export control regulations between participating
states.
124
3. Chinese Foreign Policy and the Effect of Sanctions
Despite increasing engagement in the world economy, the improvement of
economic relations between the PRC and the West has not been welcomed by all. Some
members of the U.S. congress favor re-linking economic relations with human rights,
market access, and intellectual property issues. FP leaders are aware of these attitudes
and must consider the affect of BWC and BTW policy on the foreign trade, investment,
and technology transfer it seeks to promote. Chinese intransigence with regard to
nonproliferation or evidence of duplicity revealed by BWC inspections could provide
additional cause for reducing current trade benefits or the imposition of economic
sanctions by the United States and world community. To predict the position that FP
leaders may take in BWC negotiations in the future, the effect of past economic pressures
levied against China can be explored to determine if policy trends exist.
123
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agreements,*Texts, and Histories of the Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1996), 100.
124 As with other technologies associated with BTW, those covered under Article X are dual-use
and could be used to further improve both commercial biotechnology industries and offensive BTW
capabilities. See Amy E. Smithson, "Man Versus Microbe: The Negotiations to Strengthen the Biological
Weapons Convention," in Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for Concern, Courses ofAction
(Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1998), 1 17.
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a) Human Rights Concerns and Sanctions
Diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC were first
established on 1 January 1979. The next decade was marked by increasing cooperation
and trade including extension of most-favored-nation (MFN) status to China. The United
States welcomed political and economic reforms implemented under the leadership of
Deng Xiaoping. In April 1989, however, students in Beijing held demonstrations in
Tiananmen Square calling for political liberalization. By June, troops were deployed to
maintain order. In the course of the crackdown, hundreds of civilians were killed or
wounded. To express U.S. condemnation of the government action, President Bush
suspended all arms trade, military and high-level government exchanges. He also sought
postponement of multilateral development bank loans. Congress followed that action
with legislation restricting export licenses to China for satellites, withholding
International Development Association funding, and conditionally prohibiting Export-
Import Bank support of projects in China.
Today, the United States maintains sanctions against China in eight areas in
protest of its handling of the Tiananmen situation. The effect of these measures in
moderating China's human rights policies has been slight. Beijing considers
demonstrations such as Tiananmen as a domestic issue and a direct threat to its
legitimacy, and has been unwilling to compromise in this regard. ~ Furthermore, the
current U.S. administration has de-emphasized human rights concerns in bilateral
relations with China. Table 1 lists current sanctions.
125 See Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffery J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliot. Economic Sanctions
Reconsidered, Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990.
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Table 1. Current U.S. Sanctions Against China
Sanction Description
Prohibition of indirect U.S. foreign assistance to .
China
The 1987 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act
bans indirect aid to the PRC unless the President
certifies that withholding funds is contrary to the
national interest.
126
Termination of U.S. support for multilateral
development loans to China except in cases of basic
human need.
Since 1990, the United States has abstained from
World Bank votes for loans to China that do not
promote basic human needs. 12
Military equipment and weapons trade suspended. A ban on U.S. Government and commercial
weapons sales was imposed on June 5, 1989. 128
Prohibitions on the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation and the Trade and Development
Agency.
Since 1990, the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation and Trade and Development Agency
are forbidden to offer insurance and financing to
enterprises operating in China. 129
Nuclear trade and cooperation suspended. The United States prohibits the transfer to
China of any nuclear material, facilities, or
components which could be diverted to
nuclear explosive purposes under the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 130
Export licenses for crime control and detection
equipment prohibited
Since 1990, the United States prohibits
export of crime control equipment to
China. 131
Suspension of Export-Import Bank financing The Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act of 1964
prohibits Export-Import loans to China without a
President waiver of national interest. 132
Embargo on arms and ammunition On May 26, 1994, President Clinton placed an
embargo on the import of firearms, firearm parts
and ammunition from China. 133
126Waivers have been issued for each of the fiscal years that China has been listed. See "China,
Congress, and Sanctions," (Washington D.C.; Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress 96-348
F, 17 April 1996, accessed 10 March 1998); available http://web.nps.navy.mil/-relooney/sanct.htm,
Internet.
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Kerry Dumbaugh, "China: Current U.S. Sanctions" (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research
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Ibid.
132 Waivers have been granted by the past three administrations, most recently on April 21, 1995,
to allow for extension of a loan of $237 million to purchase U.S. equipment for a power plant in China. On
February 28,' 1996, after reports that China had was supporting Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, the
Clinton Administration asked the Export-Import Bank to postpone final consideration of any new financing
for U.S. companies planning to export to China. On April 16, 1996, however, an Export-Import Bank
guarantee of $160 million to China's Yunnian Airlines was approved for the purchase of three Boeing jets,
ending the loan suspension for China. See CRS, "China, Congress, and Sanctions."
133
According to the U.S. Customs Service, such imports were projected to total approximately
$200 million in 1994. See Dumbaugh, "China: Current U.S. Sanctions."
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b) Trade Concerns
Since 1992 the United States has pursued a number of trade-related
complaints against China. Disputes over market access, intellectual property rights, and
exports of prison-labor goods have resulted in the negotiation of several memoranda-of-
understanding (MOUs) between China and the United States. While these are not
sanctions per se, they include possible retaliatory actions. The MOU negotiation process
shows a pattern of willingness on the part of FP subarena leaders to compromise over
trade issues unlike human rights, which it considers solely a domestic issue, and suggests
that economic incentives may be a useful tool to facilitate cooperation in
nonproliferation.
On 7 August 1992, the United States and China signed an MOU to ensure
that products made by prison labor in China are not exported to the United States. The
agreement was reached only after the Bush Administration threatened to increase U.S.
Customs Service inspections of imported Chinese products, and ban the release of
Chinese imports suspected of being produced by forced labor. Under the MOU, China
permits U.S. Customs officials to inspect Chinese prisons suspected of producing goods
for export.
On 10 October 1992, the United States and China signed an MOU
resolving a one-year investigation into China's trade barriers to U.S. imports which
forestalled over $1 billion in retaliatory U.S. sanctions. Under the MOU, China pledged
to publish its trade laws and regulations, eliminate a range of barriers including tariffs,
quotas, import restrictions, import licenses, and import substitution laws, and establish a
134 Dumbauah, "China: Current U.S. Sanctions."
63
joint working group on standards and testing barriers to agricultural products. The United
States, in return, pledged to support China's entry into the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) and reduce export controls on computer and telecommunications
equipment to China. 135
Concerns that China fails to provide adequate protection for U.S.
intellectual property has been the longest-standing point of contention between the two
countries. In April 1991, the U.S. Special Trade Representative's Office (USTR) accused
China of violating U.S. intellectual property rights and threatened trade sanctions against
certain Chinese imports. In the MOU reached in January 1992, China agreed to
strengthen its patent, copyright, and trade secret laws. It also agreed to improve
protection of U.S. intellectual property, including computer software, sound recordings,
and chemicals. Although China reportedly made improvements in its IPR regime, U.S.
officials determined that piracy of copyrighted works and trademarks continued, and
pressed China to take legal action against certain Chinese companies. Chinese
footdragging in 1993 and 1994 led the USTR to again threaten sanctions. On 4 February
1995, despite ongoing negotiations, U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor announced
that he was ordering the automatic imposition of 100 percent tariffs on over $1 billion
worth of Chinese imports. As a result, an IPR accord was reached committing China to
take immediate steps to address copyright piracy in China, make long-term changes to
ensure effective enforcement of intellectual property rights, and provide U.S. intellectual
property rights holders with enhanced access to the Chinese market.




The foreign policy subarena's involvement in diplomatic relations,
economic and technological policy, and multilateral arms control guarantees its
involvement in the negotiation of the BWC inspection protocol. Of the three subarenas
that provide input into policy formation, it bears the primary responsibility for assuring
the continued success of Chinese economic reform and promoting China's position as a
responsible global economic and political leader. Zhu Ronghi was elected to the office of
Premier in 1998. Previously the mayor of Shanghai, he assumed control over economic
policy when Premier Li Peng suffered a heart attack in early 1993. In his five years as
the country's economic tsar, Zhu has controlled inflation, forced banks to reform lending
practices, and earned a reputation as a no-nonsense technocrat. Given his past
involvement in economic reform, he will likely approach BWC verification with the goal
of maintaining political relations to facilitate continued investment and trade, while
avoiding actions that would threaten these benefits or China's diplomatic standing among
other major powers.
D. THE DEFENSE POLICY SUBARENA
Chinese defense activities support national security policy and China's broader
national strategic objectives. DP subarena responsibilities include the formation of
doctrine and strategy, and ensuring the readiness and training of Chinese armed forces.
The PLA is also involved in both the formation and implementation of policies
137Deng Xiaoping referred to him as "one of the few cadres who really understands how the
economy works." See Matt Forney, Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 March 1998, available
http://www.feer.com, Internet.
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concerning arms control, military equipment acquisition, and arms sales. 138 While
cooperation in international nonproliferation regimes offers technological and political
benefits, the implementation of a BWC inspection protocol threatens PLA operational
security and the autonomy of defense industries. Furthermore, the record of PLA
involvement in nonproliferation shows that defense and foreign policy objectives have
not always coincided.
1. Elements of the Defense Policy Subarena
The formation of defense policy is the domain of the PLA. Major actors include
the heads of the military departments and defense organizations, and a single
coordinating mechanism: the party Central Military Commission (CMC) and its general
office (CMC GO). 139 The uppermost tier of the CMC includes Jiang Zemin (as CMC
chairman) and Generals Liu Huaqing, Zhang Zhen, Zhang Wannian, and Chi Haotian.
Within the PLA, this five-man CMC executive committee consults with the remaining
members of the CMC in formulating defense policy. 140
Six military agencies constitute the core policy organs of the PLA. The General
Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department (GPD), General Logistics
Department (GLD), the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National
Defense (COSTESfD), the National Defense University (NDU), and the Academy of
Military Science (AMS). Leaders of these departments form the bureaucracy responsible
for executing all major operational dimensions of military policy. 141





'""Secondary PLA organs include the Strategic Missile Force, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and
PLA Navy (PLAN). Ibid., 46.
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The GSD functions as the headquarters of the PLA and the chief executive arm of
the PLA leadership. It also is responsible for procurement, operational planning, and
intelligence. While primarily an administrative entity, the GSD has the greatest input
into the defense policy process.
142
COSTIND is China's principle manager of industrial policy for technology and
oversees civilian and military science and technology (S&T). It manages conventional
and nuclear-weapons-related research, defense production, and space technology
research. It is China's primary contact for foreign military transfers. Additionally,
COSTIND is the primary bureaucracy charged with technical intelligence gathering
overseas, and provides data on arms control issues. 143
2. Defense Policy Objectives
According to June Dreyer, the PLA plays a dual role in the country's strategic
deliberations: it participates in the formulation of strategy and is charged with
implementing strategy. The active involvement of higher echelons of the PLA in
formulating national policy sets the Chinese military apart from the Western model in
which politicians decide upon policy and the military implements it. 144 The PLA,
through the Defense Policy subarena, plays an important part in arms control policy, and
is heavily involved in current discussions over the BWC inspection protocol to ensure
that its strategic interests are served. PLA leaders' perceptions of the security
" Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking, 46.
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U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Other Approaches to Civil-Military
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Office, March 1995) 10.
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June Teufel Dreyer, China's Strategic View: The Role of the People's Liberation Army,
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environment and how it has changed in recent years influence their position on BWC
verification.
a) PLA Perceptions of the Security Environment
During the 1950s, the main focus of China's defense policy was its
alliance with the Soviet Union to oppose the U.S. policy of containment. The Chinese
viewed President Truman's decision to send troops to the Korean War, Seventh Fleet
patrols in the Taiwan Straits, 13 th Air Force assets based in Taiwan, and support for the
French war in Vietnam as aggressive actions. The United States constituted the primary
military threat to China from three directions: the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Straits,
and Vietnam. In the 1 960s, China faced a military threat from both the United States and
the Soviet Union. 145
During the 1970s, Sino-U.S. relations became normalized, greatly
reducing the American threat to China's security. The Soviet Union, however, continued
to build up its military forces in the Mongolian border area, established a naval base in
Vietnam, and occupied Afghanistan in 1979. China's defense policy shifted to
emphasize preparations for an overall defensive war against its communist neighbor. 146
By 1978, Chinese leaders began to realize that even though the
competition between the United States and the USSR was fierce, the world security
environment on the whole was increasingly positive. In response, the Chinese shifted
145
Beginning in 1964, the Soviet Union sent reinforcements to its Chinese border. U.S.
involvement in Vietnam began to escalate in 1961. See Wang Zhongchun, Senior Colonel, PLA, The
Changes and Development of China 's Peripheral Security Environment and its Defense Policy (Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1996), 25.
wang, Changes and Development of China 's Peripheral Security Environment, 29.
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their defense policy from preparing for large-scale defensive war, to streamlining and
modernizing their military to meet a changing threat. 147
During the 1990s, PRC leaders saw the old bipolar structure as evolving
towards multipolarity. The Chinese believe multipolarization and unbalanced
development of world economic, political, and military forces are redefining the world
strategic situation.
148 The end of the Soviet threat, coupled with growing engagement in
international economic and security institutions, has produced perhaps the least
threatening security environment facing China since the founding of the People's
Republic in 1949. 149
In today's world, PLA leaders believe that the PRC is capable of
defending its own territory and that no aggressor is likely to attempt to conquer and rule
mainland China. PLA leaders recognize their weaknesses, however, and remain versed
in Sun Tzu's belief that the prudent general should "carefully compare the opposing army
with [ones] own, so that [one] may know where strength is superabundant and where it is
deficient."
150 While the PLA may be an effective conventional army, military leaders see
the twenty-year gap in technology between China's weapons systems and those of the
United States as a serious vulnerability. 151
Wang, Changes and Development of China 's Peripheral Security Environment, 29.
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Today's Chinese leadership sees the world security environment as more relaxed, with global
war unlikely. Major powers, for the first time since the end ofWorld War II, are not directly antagonistic
and have adjusted their military strategies toward fighting regional or local conflicts and operations other
than war (OOTW). Breakthroughs have been made in negotiations on arms control and disarmament, and
the growing integration of the world economy is seen to constrain the outbreak of global war. See Wang,
34.
149Samuel S. Kim, China's Questfor Security in the Post-Cold War World (Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1996), 1.
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onel Giles (May, 1994, accessed 5 April 1998); available
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b) Addressing a Changing Threat
The PLA is implementing a "two-tier" defense modernization strategy.
The first tier focuses on the improvement of the PLA's nuclear capability through the
creation of a small force of strategic and tactical nuclear missiles. The modernization
program is designed to provide a credible deterrent capability against both nuclear and
conventional threats from the major powers, and for possible use in limited conflicts. 152
The second tier of China's defense strategy stresses the improvement of
conventional military capabilities. The Gulf War demonstrated the type of warfare the
Chinese armed forces might face, triggering a doctrinal shift from the Dengist strategy of
fighting a "people's war under modem conditions" to a strategy of achieving victory in
local wars under high technology conditions. 1 3 In a speech at the Chinese National
Defense University in 1998, CMC Vice Chairman Chi Haotian emphasized that to face
the threat of local wars under high technology conditions "the primary task is to follow
the principle of crack units, combined efforts, and efficiency." 154 The overall
modernization objective of the PLA is to better equip and train the army so that it can
fight and win small "low intensity" border or near-abroad conflicts involving modern
precision weapons, information warfare, and combined arms doctrine. 155
c) PLA Concerns Regarding Arms Control
The administration of a BWC inspection regime poses several threats to
the CMC. Accepting the protocol means the PLA must relinquish an inexpensive force
152
China's official nuclear defense strategy continues to stress a "no first use" doctrine and
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multiplier and strategic deterrent, open sensitive facilities to inspection, and subject the
export activities of Military Industrial Enterprises (MIE) to the scrutiny of international
regulation.
No military planner can be expected to give up a potent weapon system
without good reason, and the PLA certainly considers how arms control will alter the
current military balance. PLA strength presently resides in its conventional capabilities,
but these could be negated by the asymmetric threat of WMD, including BTW. Since
several neighbors are believed to possess BTW capabilities, and given the availability of
BTW to substate groups, eliminating the threat of biological weapons could only enhance
China's national security.
156
Despite Chinese denials, the U.S. government has publicly stated that it
suspects that the PRC maintains an offensive BTW program. Regional neighbors
acknowledge this U.S. assessment. This makes China, at the very least, a "virtual" BTW
state in the eyes of its neighbors. Until the time that the BWC can detect violations of
compliance, the PLA will be reluctant to give up the means to respond in kind and the
inherent deterrent value of an ambiguous BTW capability.
d) Concerns Over Transparency
PLA leaders are concerned about implementation of a BWC inspection
protocol because of the degree of access it will grant inspectors to military capabilities
and research facilities. The Art of War remains an important text for the Chinese
156 Monte R. Bullard and James A. Lamson, "China: Security and Arms Control" (Monterey,
Calif: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1997), 4. Also, Russia, India, and North Korea all are
suspected of maintaining offensive BTW programs. See "Proliferation: Threat and Response"
(Washington, D.C.: Officer of the Secretary of Defense, November 1997), 5.
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military, and transparency runs counter to Sun Tzu's tenets on operational security. 157 As
General Liu Huaqiu has stated: "military transparency should be pursued in accordance
with the principle that the security of each country will not be undermined." 158 Sun Tzu's
belief in the opacity of military capabilities is further stressed by the passage: "In making
tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your
dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies, from the
machinations of the wisest brains." 159 PLA leaders likely see multinational inspection
teams as a mechanism for Western intelligence to "subtly pry" into some of their most
sensitive areas and may attempt to limit the degree of access granted under the BWC
inspection protocol.
e) PLA Military Industrial Enterprises
A fundamental idea in PLA ideology is that "the Army and the People are
one."
160 The PLA has long been integrated into the development of the Chinese
economy. Today, the sale of arms and related equipment is an important source of
income for the Chinese economy in general and the PLA specifically. More active
implementation of export controls for dual-use equipment outlined under the BWC has
the potential to cut into PLA revenues.
In 1944, the Chinese had only a minimal defense-industrial base because
of the agrarian nature of the Chinese economy, and the devastation wreaked by both
World War II and the Chinese Civil War. The defense industrial base which developed
in the 1950s was organized along Soviet lines using aid and engineers from the USSR.
157
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Following the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, the Chinese sought to develop an
indigenous arms capability, and established a group of eight Ministries of Machine
Industry (MMI) responsible for the electronics, aerospace, shipbuilding, nuclear weapons
and energy sectors.
161 The low level of sophistication of the military industrial base in
the 1960s and 1970s, coupled with the PLA's focus on the Maoist doctrine of "People's
War" with its emphasis on massed infantry tactics, justified continued production of low-
tech weapons and equipment.
The death of Mao and the rise of Deng Xiaoping, who took a less
ideological line, changed the focus of military industry. Deng's "Four Modernizations"
doctrine stressed the necessity of advancing agriculture, industry, science and technology,
and national defense, in that order. As part of this national modernization effort,
resources were shifted from military to commercial economic development. The PLA
embraced this shift and tolerated short-term budget and force reductions on the premise
that it would ultimately benefit from a more sophisticated national technological,
industrial, and scientific base. 162 Left to fend for itself to provide resources for sustaining
and modernizing forces, the PLA turned to arms exports. 163
PLA-run arms manufacturers - notably New Era and Poly Technologies -
became extremely successful. PLA entrepreneurial success, however, weakened the
CCP's direct involvement in most arms exports, which the PLA views as normal business
transactions. Most conventional arms transfers are handled by Poly Technologies. Units
159 Sun Tzu, "The Art of War," trans. Lionel Giles (May, 1994, accessed 5 April 1998); available
from http://home.navisoft.com/entisoft/artofwar.htm, Internet.





Although the Chinese defense budget has risen by over 10 percent annually for the past several
years, resources for military modernization remain constrained.
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of its sister company, New Era, which produces what are considered "sensitive exports"
include the China Nuclear Energy Industrial Corporation (CNEIC), Great Wall Industrial
Corporation, China Precision Machinery Import Export Corporation (CPMEIC) that
makes the M-series missiles and dual-use medical equipment, and China North Industries
Corporation (NORINCO). 164 Among the commercial enterprises operated by the PLA
are a number of industries that would be subject to scrutiny under the BWC compliance
protocol.
165
In the past, military enterprises and trading companies have enjoyed a
great deal of autonomy. Export controls in China originated as a way to measure
economic activity to tax it and originally had no connection with nonproliferation policy.
Accordingly, MIE activities have been been largely beyond the control of the central
government and there is little evidence that Beijing has promulgated nonproliferation
export controls to regulate transfer of sensitive technology. 166 Officially, export controls
are the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
(MoFTEC), but in practice, products from defense industries have never fallen under its
control. Current expot control regulations concern only non-defense products. In fact,
there are few specfic administrative procedures for export control. Export control
decisions are made on an ad hoc basis through ministerial consulation. Full
164
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participation in the BWC would require a major overhaul of China's export control
system.
168
To date, China has been reluctant to enter into multilateral export
agreements such as the Australia Group (AG), the Zangger Committee, and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group.
I69 The AG is an informal forum of states whose goal is to impede
chemical and biological weapons proliferation by coordinating export controls on certain
microorganisms, toxins, and equipment that could be used in a BTW program.
Acceptance of a verification protocol may force the PLA to accept more active
monitoring of dual-use equipment and technology exports by its industrial complex. Past
reluctance to join export control groups demonstrates the PLA's desire to maintain close
control of its MIE.
3. The PLA's Record on Arms Control
Past PLA involvement in nonproliferation agreements could help predict future
participation in BWC negotiations. Chinese arms control policies have evolved from
insistence on the rights of every country to develop nuclear capabilities to gradual
acceptance and more active participation in international regimes. 170 The gap between
China's stated positions on nonproliferation and actual behavior shows, however, that the
PLA has not been bound in the past by export restrictions initiated by the foreign policy
subarena.
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a) The Early Years
The Chinese characterize the early years of arms control primarily as an
effort by the United States and the Soviet Union to prevent other nations from reaching
their levels of technical sophistication. According to Monte Bullard, the 1963 Limited
Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), the 1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) and the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) all appeared to the PLA as a
conspiracy on the part of the United States and Soviet Union to maintain their
preponderance in nuclear capacities and to constrain Chinese nuclear weapons
development. m China refused to join the agreements, but adopted a declared policy of
nuclear nonproliferation to other countries. During the post- 1978 modernization drive,
however, the PLA established a pattern of exporting nuclear materials and technology to
a number of nations with secret nuclear weapons programs. Examples of such sales
include exports of heavy water to India and Argentina, nuclear technology to Brazil,
Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and South Africa, and a reactor sale to Algeria. 172
b) Nuclear Nonproliferation
The first substantive Chinese involvement in nuclear cooperation was to
join the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984, and to endorse IAEA
safeguards for is nuclear exports in 1985. Throughout the 1980s, Beijing continued to
provide assurances that it did not contribute to nuclear proliferation and that it supported
internationally accepted nonproliferation guidelines "in principle." Evidence began to
accumulate, however, that China was helping Pakistan operate its Kahuta uranium-
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enrichment plant and that Beijing had provided Islamabad with a design for a 25-kiloton
implosion device and enough weapons-grade uranium to produce two weapons.
Furthermore, in 1989, China helped Pakistan build the PARR-2 research reactor (which
uses highly enriched uranium) and helped upgrade the PARR-1 reactor in 1991. After
German, Japanese, and French firms refused to sell Pakistan components, China signed a
contract for a 300 megawatt reactor. 174
China's nuclear cooperation with Iran in the late 1980s also raised
questions about Beijing's commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. In 1991, Western
intelligence agencies revealed that the PLA-controlled CNEIC had conducted covert
transfers of reactor technology for Iran's Isfahan complex beginning in 1989. Initially,
the Chinese embassy denied the allegations, but under increasing attention, finally
admitted to cooperative contracts with Iran to provide a calutron and two 300 megawatt
power reactors. 17
On 9 March 1992, U.S. encouragement and increasing economic pressures
led China to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). According to
official Chinese statements, membership enhanced Chinese security by discouraging
India, Pakistan, South Korea, and Japan from developing or enhancing their own nuclear
weapons. 176 In reality, foreign policy leaders were probably motivated by several other
goals:
In the aftermath of Tiananmen, China hoped to deflect criticism of its
nuclear export policy.
173
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• Signing the NPT was a step toward securing normal MFN trade status
from the United States.
• NPT membership secured China's ability to purchase nuclear materials
and services, particularly from France and other countries unwilling to
sell to non-NPT states. The loosening of some U.S. controls on
exports to China, and new reactor deals with France, Canada, Japan,
Russia, and South Korea in 1994 support the utility of Beijing's
signing the NPT. 177
U.S. intelligence discovered in 1995, however, that Chinese companies had exported
5000 ring magnets to Pakistan for use in uranium enrichment in clear violation of the
NPT. Public disclosure of the violation and threatened economic sanctions resulted in
May 1996 Chinese pledges to the United States to institute a new national system of
export controls.
178
Despite these assurances, the Central Intelligence Agency stated in a
July 1997 unclassified report, that for the period July to December 1996 - after China's
May 1996 pledge - that the PRC remained a key supplier of nuclear technology to
Pakistan and Iran, and that Chinese scientists probably worked at Iranian nuclear
facilities.
179
To supplement the threat of sanctions and bolster the Chinese commitment
to nuclear nonproliferation, the Clinton administration has pursued a policy of
engagement by offering technology transfer incentives. In November 1997, President
Clinton reached an agreement with Chinese President Jiang Zemin allowing the sale of
civilian light water nuclear reactors to China in exchange for written pledges to end
nuclear trade with Iran. (The agreement, approved by Congress in 1985, had been
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delayed by China's past history of proliferation behavior.) 180 How the Agreement for
Nuclear Cooperation will affect Chinese compliance with the NPT remains to be seen.
c) Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation
Missile nonproliferation became a paramount issue in U.S.-China relations
in June 1991, when the United States accused PRC government-operated corporations of
exporting nuclear-capable M-9 missiles to Syria, and M-ll missile technology to
Pakistan, and imposed sanctions. By November 1991, following a visit by Secretary
of State Baker, China agreed to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime's
(MTCR) export constraints if the sanctions were lifted. At the same time, China asked
that advanced fighter aircraft be restricted in addition to missiles, because their payloads
exceed those of ballistic missiles. (This would have blocked the U.S. transfer of F-16
fighter aircraft to Taiwan - directly impacting China's security.) The United States did
not agree to include aircraft, but sanctions were lifted on March 23, which allowed U.S.
firms to transfer dual use and high technology to China. 182 Beijing's promises, however,
did not end PLA exports.
On 24 August 1993, the United States again determined that China
shipped M-ll missile equipment to Pakistan and again reimposed sanctions on eleven
PLA-operated arms enterprises. Those sanctions were lifted on 4 October 1994, after the
Chinese Foreign Minister signed a pledge not to export restricted equipment. 183 Reports
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of Chinese missile technology cooperation and transfers to Iran and North Korea have
continued to surface and U.S.-China relations have oscillated between cooperation and
confrontation.
In another series of nonproliferation initiatives, the Clinton administration
may offer China access to restricted rocket technology if Beijing agrees to end missile
exports to Iran, Pakistan, and other developing nations. The proposal promises expanded
commercial and scientific space cooperation with China (in limited areas) if China meets
conditions for joining the MTCR and controls its missile-related exports. The New York
Times reports that the agreement may be signed when the President visits China in June
1998.
184
According to Bullard, part of China's motivation for participation in arms
control agreements has been the belief that in an increasingly multipolar world, the
elimination of WMD would force a new reliance on conventional weapons, China's
traditional strength.
185
Furthermore, Chinese cooperation in international arms control
regimes facilitates the trade and technology transfer necessary for PLA modernization
and grants the PRC firmer footing on the moral high ground in arms control discussions.
The historical record of Chinese proliferation behavior, however, demonstrates reluctance
on the part of PLA-controlled arms industries to adhere to arms control agreements
negotiated by the MoFA. The relative autonomy of MIEs, in conjunction with lax
internal export controls, has resulted in a gap between stated Chinese policy on
nonproliferation and actual behavior. Evidence suggests the utility of sanctions and
incentives to ensure the compliance of the defense subarena is uncertain.
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E. STRATEGIC RESEARCH, ANALYSIS, AND INTELLIGENCE SUBARENA
The Strategic Research, Analysis, and Intelligence (SRAI) subarena supports
decision-makers in the foreign and defense policy subarenas and the NSO subarena.
SRAI provides recommendations on political, economic, technological, and military
developments, in addition to preparing country-specific military studies and input into
weapons procurement and arms control policies. SRAI representatives play an
important role in the BWC negotiation process. They see participation in on-site
inspections as a valuable new collection opportunity.
1. Functional Elements of the SRAI Subarena
This "national research bureaucracy" includes a range of institutes attached to
major organs of either the foreign or defense policy subarenas. 1 7 The most significant
civilian SRAI agencies are subordinate to the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), and the Xinhua News Agency.
a) The Ministry of State Security
The Ministry of State Security (MSS) is China's primary human
intelligence (HUMENT) agency. The MSS fields case officers under both official
government covers, and nongovernment covers. Official covers have included diplomats,
trade and industry figures, commercial officers, military attaches, journalists, scientists,
and students. 188
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Civilian research agencies, like the MSS, provide reports on behalf of their
parent organizations, for submission to the FALSG and PBSC. Their military
counterparts provide similar resources to the defense policy subarena and some input into
the national strategic objectives and foreign policy subarenas. The most significant
military research agencies are subordinate to the MND, the GSD, and COSTIND. 189
b) The Military Intelligence Department
The Military Intelligence Department (MID) of the PLA's General Staff
Department (GSD) is the second largest organization in the PRC involved in HUMINT
collection. It provides tactical, strategic, and technological intelligence to the military
command structure. The MID's Bureau of Science and Technology (BST) is tasked
specifically with research, design, and technical exploitation. Eftimiades concludes that
the existence of the BST indicates that Chinese military intelligence is involved in
espionage directed against foreign science and technology. 190
2. SRAI information objectives
The PRC is a regional rather than global military power, and focuses less on the
international security environment than nations with global commitments. The PRC's
perception of threats dictates the information requirements levied on its intelligence
services. It has, therefore, little to gain from intense intelligence collection and analysis
of activities directed at global alliances outside its region of influence. 191 Accordingly,
the PRC continues to focus its intelligence collection on issues that affect its internal
189




Nicholas Eftimiades, China 's Ministry ofState Security: Coming ofAge in the International
Arena, Occasional Papers in Contemporary Asian Studies Number 2-1992(109) (College Park, Maryland:
School of Law, University of Maryland, 1992) 5.
82
stability, regional security, technological and economic development, and military
modernization.
The PBSC promulgates policies that serve its military, political and economic
self-interest. Primary among these interests is the realization of economic and
technological benefits of close ties with advanced industrialized nations. China's SRAI
services are playing an increasingly greater role in supporting these national policy
objectives by targeting and exploiting the technological and economic infrastructures of
many modern industrialized nations. 192 Beijing has set aggressive goals to develop
biotech applications ranging from new medicines, diagnostic products, vaccines and gene
therapies to the genetic engineering of plants and animals. 193 BWC inspections will
provide a new source of access to modern pharmaceutical and biotechnology.
3. Operations Against Foreign Technology
Public exposure of PRC intelligence activities in Taiwan, Japan and the United
States demonstrates that SRAI agencies have actively tried to steal foreign military and
commercial technology. Furthermore, increasing participation in multinational
nonproliferation inspection regimes may indicate that the SRAI community sees BWC
inspections as a new potential collection opportunity.
a) Nuclear Technology
In the past, SRAI agencies have acquired nuclear weapons technology by
sending scientists overseas on scholarly exchange programs. Reportedly, the information
China used to produce the neutron bomb detonated in 1988 was obtained through
l92
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Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. In a recently released Government
Accounting Office report to Congress, investigators concluded that between 1994 and
1996, the Department of Energy failed to conduct background investigations on hundreds
of Chinese scientists and visitors to the nation's top three nuclear weapons
laboratories.
194
According to the report, of the 1,464 visitors from China during the
period, fewer that 2 percent were checked. Subsequent review by the FBI showed that
some of the visitors without background checks had intelligence connections and that
visitors had been given after-hours access to laboratories and classified information in
open workshops. 195
In a unrelated 1997 investigation by the FBI's Foreign Counterintelligence
Squad, U.S. physicist Peter Lee was arrested for providing the Chinese government with
classified technical information relating to his job at Los Alamos National Laboratory.
Lee, a laser energy expert, passed information relating to nuclear weapons while lecturing
in China as a research scientist for TRW. In a plea bargain he admitted to espionage
activities from 1985 to 1997 and received 15 years in prison and a $250,000 fine. 196
b) Commercial Technology
Senior U.S. officials have agreed publicly that China is the most active
foreign power engaged in the illegal acquisition of American commerical technology.
According to Senator Richard Shelby, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, "China is trying to make a great leap forward, technologically speaking,
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and it has great needs for information, especially in the high-tech field. This is going to
be an ongoing challenge for both law enforcement and business."
Chinese clandestine collection operations in the United States have
expanded to the point that approximately 50 percent of almost 900 illegal technology
1 OR
transfer cases documented annually are attributed to the Chinese government. Chinese
industrial espionage is believed to run the gamut from routine competitive intelligence
gathering at trade shows to the theft of company trade secrets from offices and labs with
computers, defense, and biotechnology topping the list of targeted industries. 199
Geographical regions targeted include Silicon Valley, Detroit, North Carolina's Research
Triangle Park, and the Pennsylvania-New Jersey area, where many pharmaceutical and
biotechnology firms are based. For example, in 1993, a Chinese spy was apprehended
trying to steal cell cultures used in producing Epogen from Amgen, a biotechnology firm
based in Thousand Oaks, California. Epogen, used to treat anemia and kidney dialysis
patients, has become a $1.2 billion-a-year drug. 200 Losses from the theft of intellectual
property cost U.S. companies more than $300 billion in 1997, according to a survey of
the American Society for Industrial Security. 201
c) Participation in Nonproliferation Regimes
Elements of the SRAI subarena have taken an interest in several
nonproliferation regimes. Participation in multi-national inspection teams allows access
to sensitive commercial and military research facilities in both scheduled and challenge
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inspections. Since the PRC intelligence community has his used academics and scientists
traveling abroad as collectors, experts of the caliber required by BWC-sponsored teams
would be ideally placed to collect technical secrets and proprietary industrial information.
COSTIND primarily conducts research and analysis on specific weapons-
related issues, and has taken the lead in studies on disarmament, arms control, and
weapons development. COSTIND also directs an Arms Control and Disarmament
Program that sponsors seminars on arms control and conveys technical information to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and agencies of the defense policy subarena. Approximately
half of the current Chinese delegation to the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) in
Geneva is composed of arms control specialists from COSTIND.202
Most recently, Chinese experts in chemical and biological weapons have
taken an active role in CWC inspections and UNSCOM operations in Iraq. 203 While the
exact composition of Chinese teams is not known, the precedent for participation in
compliance protocols has been set. The UNSCOM mission in Iraq has been called the
most intrusive inspection regimen ever undertaken, and lessons learned will certainly be
applied to challenge inspection procedures under the BWC.
The example of Chinese scientific delegates at a Paris trade show dipping
neckties into a photo-processing solution to obtain samples for exploitation is often cited
as an amateurish attempt at industrial espionage. 204 In truth, similar simple collection
techniques and those sampling procedures used in compliance inspections could be
employed to covertly obtain proprietary information from biotechnology and
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pharmaceutical facilities. SRAI Subarena organizations have been tasked to acquire the
latest biological and pharmaceutical technology. Participation in intrusive on-site
inspections under the auspices of a BWC inspection protocol potentially provides easy
access to this information.
F. RELATIVE INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE
Negotiations over BWC verification procedures fall into a grey area of foreign
policy not purely diplomatic, military, or technological. PRC government documents list
responsibility for formation of nonproliferation policy under agencies of the foreign
policy, defense, and intelligence subarenas. To predict the likely course of future
Chinese nonproliferation behavior, an assessment on the relative influence of the three
subarenas in the BWC policy process must be made.
Davis asserts that elements of the foreign policy subarena (specifically the MoFA
and MoFTEC) play a role in nonproliferation decision making, but are relatively weak
institutional actors.
205
This position is supported by the historical record of PLA-MIE
export behavior despite MoFA statements supporting nonproliferation. Both stated
responsibilities and past evidence suggests that the SRAI subarena plays only a
supporting role in formulating nonproliferation policy. It probably exerts some influence,
however, through its technical studies and recommendations provided to decision makers
in the DP and FP subarenas. The exact degree of influence wielded by each institutional
group in the BWC policy process is difficult to measure. Table 2 summarizes the
Davis bases this assessment on interviews with MoFTEC officials. See "China's
Nonproliferation and Export Control Policies," 600.
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positions of the three subarenas on BWC verification and an estimation of their relative
influence in the policy process.
Table 2. Chinese Institutional Involvement in BWC Policy Formation
Relative Influence
Institutional Priorities Potential benefits Potential costs in
Subarena Nonproliferation
Policy Formation
Foreign Policy (1) Political and (1) Trade (1) Possible
diplomatic (2) Foreign economic
relations investment sanctions Secondary*
(2) Economic (3) Technology
development transfer under
(3) Industrial Article X
modernization
Defense (1) External (1) Improvements (1) Operational
defense toBTW Security
(2) Nuclear defenses (3) BTW
modernization (2) Reduced capability and Primary*
(3) Conventional BTW threat deterrent.
forces (3) MIE autonomy
modernization
Strategic (1) Acquisition of (1) Access to (1) SRAI facilities
Research, advanced pharmaceuti- may come








(* Relative influence is unclear. This hierarchy is based on Davis's assessment. See "China's
Nonproliferation and Export Control Policies," 600.)
VI. CONCLUSION AND FINDINGS
Efforts to control the use and proliferation of BTW can be traced to the 1925
Geneva Protocol and 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. These
agreements have been largely unsuccessful because they lack a mechanism to verify
compliance. Changes in the international security environment over the last decade, in
combination with technical advances in biotechnology also have made BTW an
increasingly attractive weapon for developing nations and substate groups.
Negotiations to strengthen the BWC with an inspection protocol to confirm
compliance are ongoing in Geneva. While a "rolling draft" proposal addressing
procedures for compliance monitoring exists, members of the Convention remain split
over the issue of intrusive inspections. Debate in the United States is divided between
arms control advocates, who believe inspections will be useful in promoting compliance
and detecting violations, and those who argue that the nature of BTW and their
production make verification impossible and pose serious risks to U.S. industrial
competitiveness. Neither side, however, considers the likely effects of U.S. participation
in inspections on the behavior of other Convention parties - especially those in violation
of the BWC.
The PRC presents U.S. policy makers with a dilemma. Despite its membership in
the BWC since 1984 and an official policy denying possession of BTW, U.S. intelligence
agencies suspect that the Chinese maintain an offensive BTW program. Limiting the
further proliferation of WMD, and especially BTW, is an important priority for the
United States and allies. It is therefore important to consider the likely effects of U.S.
89
participation in a BWC inspection regime on the institutions that formulate Chinese arms
control policy.
When security, economic, and political considerations affected by a BWC
inspection protocol are applied to Swaine's model of Chinese foreign policy decision
making, interests of the defense policy, foreign policy, and strategic research, analysis,
and intelligence subarenas are brought into conflict. These subarenas consider different
aspects of the external environment when calculating the potential costs and benefits of
any particular course of foreign policy. It follows that U.S. foreign policy alters the
constraints and pressures exerted on Chinese bureaucracies and may affect outcomes of
the overall policy formation process.
The U.S. delegation to the Ad Hoc Group still lacks a formal position for
negotiation of a BWC inspection protocol. Within the U.S. government, neither the
Defense Department nor intelligence community believes that a BWC verification
protocol will provide sufficient compliance information to warrant the risk of possibly
compromising U.S. defense and trade secrets. U.S. industry, supported by the Commerce
Department, fears losing revenues and proprietary information. Officials at the State
Department are concerned that the BWC will impinge upon export control policies.
The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and most in the U.S. Congress believe that
an inspection protocol may provide useful information, but cannot stand alone to ensure
compliance. According to interim data, the only strong believers in the utility of on-site
206 Amy E. Smithson, "Man Versus Microbe: The Negotiations to Strengthen the Biological
Weapons Convention," in Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasonsfor Concern, Courses ofAction
(Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, January 1998), 1 19.
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inspections in providing accurate compliance data are staffers on the National Security
Council.
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Given the incomplete status of the rolling text protocol and the lack of consensus
with regard to the utility of intrusive inspection for BWC compliance within the U.S.
government, American participation in an inspection regime cannot be assumed. Three
potential U.S. courses of action are possible:
(1) The United States could accept the protocol with an
understanding of the limitations of inspection for verifying
compliance.
(2) The United States could neither accept nor reject the protocol;
negotiations over procedural details continue.
(3) The United States could reject the protocol.
The course of action that the United States decides to follow will alter the perceived costs
and benefits of BWC inspections for Chinese governmental organizations and could
affect the overall direction of their policy.
A. U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF THE BWC INSPECTION PROTOCOL
The U.S. executive branch may gain the support of the Department of Defense
and industry, and push for acceptance of an intrusive inspection protocol as part of a
larger arms control endeavor. This course of action would coincide with recent attempts
to engage China in nuclear and ballistic missile arms control.
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1. Foreign Policy Subarena Recommendations
The MoFA and FALSG would probably consider American acceptance of the
protocol as an indication that Chinese participation would be expected. Foreign policy
bodies would view Chinese refusal to accept the protocol as potentially impeding
continued economic engagement and the trade, investment, and aid required for growth
and internal stability.
Technological exchange and training provisions under Article X of the BWC will
certainly be linked to acceptance of the protocol. Refusal to join would also deny the
Chinese pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries the potential benefits of Western
research and development. This is a significant consideration given the size of the
Chinese population, the unsophisticated PRC health care system, and the desire of party
leadership to raise standards of living to legitimize their system of government.
China has long considered itself "the Middle Kingdom" and is striving to reaffirm
its leadership position in the region and achieve recognition as a rising world economic
and political power. Increasing involvement in multilateral economic and defense
agreements serves the Chinese purpose in this regard by demonstrating good will and
cooperation to the international community. Given China's long-stated position against
possession of BTW, refusal to accept an inspection protocol could weaken the PRC's
regional leadership role and undermine diplomatic progress made in the last decade.
Leadership in the foreign policy subarena likely considers the benefits of
accepting inspections as part of a BWC compliance protocol to be greater that the
potential costs. To maintain a benign political and economic environment, foreign policy
decision-makers will probably recommend dismantling or converting any existing
92
offensive BTW programs to civil or commercial use permitted under the BWC.
Discovery of past duplicity could reduce Chinese credibility within the BWC, but would
be difficult to prove, given the dual-use nature of BTW. Should the United States accept
an intrusive inspection protocol, the foreign policy subarena will likely recommend that
the PRC also participate rather than risk political and economic isolation.
2. Defense Policy Subarena Recommendations
PLA leaders will view American acceptance of an inspection protocol as
challenging military operational secrecy and autonomy, while to a lesser degree offering
the possibility of reducing threats and qualitatively improving PLA capabilities.
The intrusive nature of challenge inspections will subject PLA facilities to an
unheard of degree of transparency and could reveal capabilities and weaknesses to
potential adversaries, including the United States. Furthermore, inspections and export
controls on dual-use materials and equipment delineated under the BWC compliance
protocol could subject PLA military industrial enterprises (MIE) to unwanted scrutiny
and threaten lucrative export contracts. If PLA senior leadership is held accountable for
MIE actions under international export monitoring provisions, violations such as those in
the ballistic missile and nuclear areas will be more difficult to deny responsibility for.
The PLA likely considers its BTW as a deterrent to BTW use by Russia and other
nations which have the same capability. The defense subarena would therefore be
reluctant to remove a potent weapon from its arsenal. In the future, a less threatening
security environment and improvements to its own nuclear capabilities could conceivably
lessen the degree to which BTW figure into the Chinese deterrent calculus. Since the
PLA has shifted its focus toward fighting "local wars under high technology conditions"
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and improving its conventional capabilities, the elimination of the asymmetric BTW
threat may, in theory, also enhance PLA traditional strengths.
The only immediate benefit for the PLA from accepting BWC inspections,
however, would be in the area of BTW defense. Under Article X, provisions are made
for transferring biological defense technology and training. Since improved defenses
reduce an opponent's potential advantage in employing BTW, the likelihood of their use
is lessened. This defensive technology is, however, dual use and could be used to
develop more effective offensive BTW capabilities.
PLA leadership must balance the significant costs of transparency and losing both
a deterrent and force multiplier against the benefit of acquiring BTW defensive
technology. PLA leaders are therefore probably unlikely to lobby for accepting intrusive
inspections. If the DP subarena does accept the protocol it will be with the understanding
that BTW capabilities could be rapidly reconstituted if necessary in the future, and that
this fact in itself has inherent deterrent value.
3. Strategic Research, Analysis, and Intelligence Subarena Recommendations
The strategic research, analysis, and intelligence subarena would most likely
welcome U.S. acceptance of BWC inspections and recommend that China participate as
well. Reciprocal provisions in the protocol would guarantee that elements of the Chinese
intelligence community be included in multinational teams. These teams would be
granted access to the facilities and technologies that this subarena most actively targets.
Transparency is a two-sided coin, however, and while SRAI elements involved in BTW
research would also be subject to scrutiny, the level of Chinese pharmaceutical and
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biotechnology remains well below that of the West. The SRAI subarena stands to gain
more that it has to lose in BWC inspection participation.
4. Most Likely Chinese Reaction
Should the United States agree to accept the BWC inspection protocol, the costs
to the dominant defense interest may be closely balanced by the benefits in the political,
economic, and technological areas. Chinese behavior would be dependent upon the
ability of the FP subarena to convince PLA leaders that spillover benefits of continued
economic engagement for defense exceed the potential costs of transparency. This would
not be an easy task. National leaders' emphasis on "comprehensive national strength,
however, supports the case that economic growth and stability are prerequisites of
military strength, and that improvements to the Chinese industrial base further serve PLA
modernization. In the end, it is possible that the PLA might accept transparency
measures, in hopes of eventually benefiting from continued trade, investment, and
technology transfer that cooperation in arms control facilitates.
B. NEGOTIATIONS OVER PROCEDURAL DETAILS CONTINUE
A second course of U.S. action would be to abstain from either accepting or
rejecting a BWC inspection protocol. Within the Ad Hoc Group, the non-aligned nations
have held fast to a 2001 deadline for presenting the completed inspection protocol for a
general vote. Debate over details of compliance measures has been ongoing since 1991,
and the draft protocol remains far from complete.
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1. Foreign Policy Subarena Recommendations
Should the United States choose not to commit to the BWC inspection protocol,
or if negotiations over procedural details continue past the set deadline, the PRC foreign
policy subarena would likely recommend maintaining the status quo. Without means for
verifying compliance, accusations of clandestine Chinese BTW programs cannot be
proven. The risk of violations being exposed is minimized, and the United States and
international community are unlikely to link economic issues to suspicions that can be
easily denied. Should exports in violation of the BWC be discovered, sanctions would
likely be levied only against individual companies or enterprises, minimizing damage to
the overall Chinese economy. Foreign policy subarena elements would continue to
participate in Ad Hoc Group negotiations and attempt to reap the benefits of Article X
provisions in exchange for agreement to non-intrusive or limited inspection measures
only.
2. Defense Policy Subarena Recommendations
PLA leaders would welcome a neutral American position on BWC inspection. If
the BWC remains toothless, opacity is maintained and Chinese BTW programs could
continue unimpeded. Elements of the defense policy subarena would undoubtedly
remain involved in the BWC negotiation process to ensure that their interests are
represented and to monitor proposed inspection procedures (and devise ways to
circumvent them.)
Without the export restrictions of an inspection protocol, the PLA would maintain
authority over its MIE's and likely continue sales of BTW related equipment.
Furthermore, while the PLA may deny BTW programs and stockpiles, public statements
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of U.S. suspicions have made China, at the very least, a "virtual" BTW power. Potential
adversaries must acknowledge the capability of the Chinese to produce BTW. The
ambiguity allowed by the absence of BWC inspections is a strong and inexpensive
deterrent.
3. Strategic Research, Analysis, and Intelligence Subarena Recommendations
The PRC research, analysis and intelligence community stands to lose a
significant collection opportunity from American indecision over BWC inspection.
Without an inspection protocol, its own involvement in BTW development is shielded
from disclosure. American non-participation in the protocol, however, denies the SRAI
subarena access to American biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries.
4. Most Likely Chinese Reaction
If the United States government cannot reach a consensus to either accept or
reject intrusive inspections as part of a BWC compliance protocol, Chinese delegates will
try to prolong negotiations indefinitely. China will likely continue to advocate
nonproliferation while circumventing prohibitions of BTW possession and transfer. A
non-verifiable BWC best serves the overall Chinese strategic interest. The Chinese
would be free to continue clandestine production, while enjoying the economic and
political benefits of improving international relations. BWC delegates will continue to
stress Chinese leadership in non-proliferation, the adequacy of non-intrusive compliance
monitoring measures, and the necessity of defensive Article X assistance to the
developing world.
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C. U.S. REJECTION OF THE BWC INSPECTION PROTOCOL
If the U.S. Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and
industry can convince proponents of the protocol that the costs of intrusive
inspection outweigh the value of the information produced, or if the non-aligned
group is successful in weakening the protocol to the point of being ineffectual,
the United States could opt to reject inspections outright. While this is probably
the least likely course of action, given the commitment the U.S. government has
made to strengthening the BWC, it should be considered.
1. Foreign Policy Subarena Recommendations
China and the United States participate in several multinational arms control
agreements (including the NPT, CWC, and the UNSCOM mission in Iraq) which provide
for inspections to monitor compliance. The Chinese foreign policy subarena would likely
consider U.S. rejection of compliance monitoring under the BWC a serious departure
from past American policy and work to limit the negative diplomatic and economic
consequences.
It may be in the foreign policy subarena' s best interests to limit the intrusiveness
of BWC inspections, but not to the point that it results in withdrawal of nonproliferation
incentives. FP leaders would accept U.S. rejection of the protocol, but would likely seek
to maintain bilateral BTW nonproliferation ties with the United States and other major
powers (as they have done in the ballistic missile and nuclear areas). This would
facilitate the continued exchange of treaty assurances for economic and technological
payoffs.
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2. Defense Policy Subarena Recommendations
PLA leadership would likely welcome outright American rejection of the
inspection protocol. Without a forum to address BWC violations, accusations could only
be aired before the UN Security Council, of which China is a permanent member with
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veto power.
3. Strategic Research, Analysis, and Intelligence Subarena Recommendations
Should the United States reject an intrusive inspection regime, the SRAI subarena
stands to lose not only collection opportunities, but also the benefits of legal transfers of
advanced technology. Incentives play a large part in promoting compliance in arms
control efforts such as the NPT and MTCR. Article X of the BWC encourages scientific
exchange between participants. Since the United States leads the world in biotechnology
and pharmaceutical innovation, American withdrawal would remove a potentially rich
resource.
As concerns over espionage become more widespread, industry also is increasing
security measures, complicating clandestine foreign collection efforts. U.S. rejection of
inspections could further heighten awareness of the espionage threat. This course of
action therefore, threatens two primary sources of SRAI information. To keep these
information channels open, subarena leaders would likely encourage accommodation on
the part of policy makers.
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4. Most Likely Chinese Reaction
American rejection of BWC inspection provisions could adversely affect the
interests of SRAI subarena by limiting access to technology and to a lesser degree,
foreign policy institutions by threatening to cool economic and political relations.
Without U.S. participation, however, it is highly unlikely that the PLA could be
persuaded to accept inspections. U.S. withdrawal from the protocol would result in the
creation of two groups within the BWC: those who accept inspections and those who do
not. Faced with this possibility, PRC negotiators would continue to resist intrusive
inspections but would work to keep channels with the United States and other non-
signatories open. China would likely pursue limited bilateral BTW agreements with the
goal of securing economic or technological incentives.
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Without an inspection protocol this an suspecting nation's only avenue for redress. It has been exercised
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D. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY - ENGAGING CHINA IN THE BWC
It appears that of the three possible courses of U.S. action, only the first offers the
chance of leading the PRC into a BWC inspection protocol. Table 3 summarizes
findings.
Table 3. Findings
U.S. course of action Likely Chinese reaction Implications
Accept inspection protocol Outcome uncertain U.S. acceptance may encourage
Chinese participation in BWC
inspections.
Continue negotiations Reject inspection protocol No change to current BTW/BWC
policy
Reject inspection protocol Reject inspection protocol No change to current BTW/BWC
policy
While Chinese agreement to a protocol may be possible under the first course of action.
Exact outcomes are difficult to predict without an accurate measure of relative
institutional influence in the decision-making process. American participation in
inspections will, however, have an impact on the Chinese institutional cost-benefit
calculation and could tip the scales against the defense interest. The Chinese reaction in
the last two cases can be predicted with a higher degree of certainty. If the United States
fails to reach a decision over inspections, or rejects the protocol altogether, China will
most likely reject it as well.
only once: in 1997, Cuba accused the United States of spraying its sugar crop with an damaging plant
disease. Nothing came of the proceedings.
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The proliferation of biological weapons is a global problem that will require a
concerted international effort to control. Without a means to monitor compliance, the
BWC will remain toothless and BTW proliferation will continue. As BTW spread to
developing nations and non-state actors, the possibility that they will be used in conflict
increases.
International nuclear safeguards have been likened to the medieval development
of the handshake; extending ones empty sword hand demonstrated peaceful intention by
decreasing offensive potential and increasing vulnerability.20 But since men often wore
both a sword and a dagger assessable to the left hand, the handshake did not make one
absolutely incapable of surprise attack. While this metaphor was originally derived to
describe arms control agreements for nuclear weapons, it applies even closer to current
efforts to control biological and toxin weapons. The institution of an intrusive inspection
regime for the BWC is like the handshake, in that it demonstrates good intentions,
increases confidence, and may encourage more responsible behavior. Inspections have
costs and limitations, however, and cannot completely eliminate the possibility of
surprise.
The growth of the PRC and its past record in WMD proliferation necessitate its
active involvement in the BWC. If the United States is serious about BTW
nonproliferation, the only chance of engaging China in the process may be to push
forward and implement an inspection protocol. While expensive and not a stand-alone
solution to the problem ofBTW proliferation, onsite inspections would be a step toward
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improving the regime, and in the long term may encourage suspected BWC violators,
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